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  selective remodelling of Asian and other exotic traditions  to suit the

needs of Western environmentalist rhetoric drawn from an intellectual

pedigree which favoured idealised native images. Conklin and Graham

[1995: 697] put it this way:



Contemporary visions of transcultural eco-solidarity differ in that native peoples are treated not

as peripheral members whose inclusion requires shedding their own traditions but as paradigmatic

exemplars of the community’s core values.


In this new vision indigenous peoples are given central focus because

of rather than in spite of their cultural differences. But, as Conklin and

Graham point out,  this  perception and consequent alliance between

indigenous peoples and science is a fragile one, based upon an assumed

ideal of [indigenous] realities which contrasts with the realities for

the local people themselves. Such assumptions are in danger of leading

to `cross-cultural misperceptions and strategic misrepresentations’

[Conklin and Graham 1995: 696]. The reconstitution in an Asian context

has often involved both the great and the little traditions (the

scholarly and the tribal), often failing to distinguish between the two,

and confusing ideal symbolic representations with hard-headed

empirical practice. It is not altogether surprising, therefore, that this

muddle has confirmed some scientists in their worst prejudices and led

to the inevitable backlash summed-up in phrases such as  `the

environmentalist myth’ [see e.g. Diamond 1987 versus Johannes 1987].


Nevertheless, with the discarding of the more fanciful  portrayals of

the wisdom of traditional peoples,  a more practical approach has

emerged. This has been encouraged by anthropologists and other

development professionals eager to make IK palatable to technocratic

consumers and by technocrats themselves  already predisposed to see a

role for IK. Its dissemination has been part of a rhetoric extolling the

virtues of `participation’, `empowerment’, `bottom up’, and `farmer-

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  first’. Some measure of the institutionalisation of this version of IK

(and in this version abbreviations of the IK and TEK variety are de

rigeur) is the number of  networking organisations and research units  

[see Warren, Slikkerveer and Brokensha 1995: xv-xviii, 426-516]. One

of the difficulties with this approach, however, has been that

categorisation of IK  effectively becomes `a direct consequence of the

limited parameters of western development/scientific theories which

rely upon an ordered conceptual framework from which and in which to

work. As Hobart [1994: 16] observes:



there is an unbridgeable, but largely unappreciated gap between the neat rationality of development

agencies’ representations which imagine the world as ordered and manageable and the actualities of

situated social practices.


As a consequence, we seem to end up with a theory which

misrepresents the context in which certain knowledges occur and are

experienced. Hobart has pointed to the limitations of development and

scientific knowledge in that they ignore or undervalue contexts. By

uncritically placing local knowledge systems under the umbrella

concept `indigenous knowledge’, decontextualisation is necessarily

implied, and the unique and important knowledge of specific groups

becomes subject to the same limitations and criticisms that we make

on behalf of western science and development theories.  Moreover, the

tendency to define indigenous knowledge  in relation to western

knowledge  is problematic in that it raises western science to a level

of reference, ignoring the fact that all systems are culture-bound, and

thereby excluding western knowledge itself from analysis. This limits

analysis of indigenous systems by narrowing the parameters of

understanding through the imposition of western categories. Fairhead

and Leach [1994: 75] draw attention to this problem, particularly

regarding the tendency to isolate bits of knowledge which are fitted

into a `mirror set of ethno-disciplines’ for the purposes of analysis and

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  documentation. By examining local knowledge in relation to scientific

disciplinary distinctions, they point to how this can lead to the

construction of certain aspects of local knowledge as important, while

excluding or ignoring other areas and possibilities of knowledge which

do not fall within the selective criteria of western science. They argue,

moreover, that this risks overlooking broadly held understandings of

agroecological knowledge and social relations. So, for example,

research and extension agents examining Kouranko farmers tree

management practices in Guinea  fail to take into account farmers’

tree-related knowledge which involves knowledge and management of

crops, water, vegetation succession as well as the ecological and

socioeconomic conditions which influence them. By failing to include

the broader constitutive processes surrounding Kouranko tree

management, extension workers risk obscuring and decontextualising

local knowledge, and jeopardise the potential it may have for

development on specific and general levels [Fairhead and Leach 1994:

75].


Thus, in this depleted vision, IK becomes a major concept within

development discourse, a convenient abstraction,  consisting of bite-

sized chunks of information that can be slotted into western

paradigms, fragmented, decontextualised; a kind of quick fix if not a

panacea. Such approaches are in danger of repeating the same problems

of simplification and over-generalisation that Richards and Hobart

identify as major limitations in development theory, and in science

applied to development `ignoring specific and local experience in favour

of a generalisable and universal solution’ [Harris 1996: 14].

Furthermore, in the hands of NGOs - which in the last few decades have

become significant `knowledge-making institutions’ - and within the

`universalising discourse’ of environmentalism, IK has become further

reified. Because environmentalist and Indigenous NGOs are now an

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  influential moral and social force, stimulating public awareness,

acting as whistle-blowers and watch-dogs, and moving from the role of

critics to offering policy proposals to governments, and since they

often use the rhetoric of science, they gain enormous authority [Yearly

1996: 134]. This process has evidently yielded results in terms of

projecting a more positive image of IK.


In some important respects, the way development professionals have

contextualised and scientised IK by codifying it and rejecting the

cultural context, has simply repeated what has happened in previous

scientific encounters with traditional knowledge, as discussed above.

And, similarly, once IK is drawn within the boundaries of science it is

difficult to know where to draw the boundaries between it and science.

As we have already seen,  changing the boundaries is often sufficient to

redefine something as science, as what defines it is to a considerable

extent determined by who practices it, and in what institutional

context the practices take place. However,  the danger of turning local

knowledge into global knowledge is that `at the empirical level all IK is

relative and parochial, no two societies perceive or act upon the

environment in the same ways. Science, by comparison, is a system of

knowledge in rapid flux that seeks universal rather than local

understanding’ [Hunn 1993: 13-15].  It is precisely the local

embeddedness of IK which has made it successful.


Recording indigenous knowledge

In the introduction to The Cultural Dimension of Development,

Brokensha [1995: xvii] expresses what is at present central to the

indigenous knowledge enterprise - the focus on documenting and

recording indigenous systems in order that they be `systematically

deposited and stored for use by development practitioners.’  However,

when we consider the ways in which indigenous knowledge is perceived

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