FEATURE ARTICLE
ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING IN PRIORITY FOREST AREAS
Colin Filer
Department of Anthropology & Sociology
University of Papua New Guinea
The following article was written in April 1991 on the basis of the
author's experience over the previous year as a representative of
the University of Papua New Guinea on the Task Force mentioned in the title. Despite the somewhat optimistic tone adopted towards the end of this article, and perhaps even because of the critical tone in which parts of it are written, the Task Force died soon afterwards.
Membership of the Task Force was drawn from a variety of PNG government
departments and non-government organisations (see Appendix 1). Its
meetings and activities over the past year have been administered
by the Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC), whose Minister,
the Honourable Jim Yer Waim, was the prime recipient of its advice.
On the other hand, its activities were initially funded by a grant
of US$50,000 from the World Wildlife Fund to the Foundation for the
Peoples of the South Pacific (FSP), which is a member of the PNG National
Alliance of Non-Government Organisations (NANGO). Additional funds
have been promised by other overseas agencies, but a surfeit of local
red tape has delayed their delivery.
In 1990 the Task Force mounted two main expeditions, the first to
Woodlark Island in Milne Bay Province, the second to a number of areas
in New Ireland Province. The author of this paper participated in
the second of these expeditions in his capacity as a professional
anthropologist, and has also represented the University of Papua New
Guinea (UPNG) in the central deliberations of the Task Force. The
aim of this paper is to present what might best be described as a
socio-political analysis of the Task Force itself, and the context
in which it has been operating, in order to assess, and hopefully
to promote, the chances of halting the wanton destruction of the rainforest
in Papua New Guinea.
There are three significant respects in which this process can be
distinguished from TFAP constructions already undertaken in other
tropical countries:
These peculiarities were reflected in the criticisms inevitably levelled at the review process and its outcome, notably those published by Judge Brian Brunton, Chairman of the PNG Law Reform Commission, and by a collection of NGOs under the leadership of the New Guinea Island Campaign Group and the Rainforest Information Centre, both based in New South Wales. Unimpressed by the Bank's new green clothes, they viewed the package of proposed reforms as a castle built on the sand of several of false assumptions, especially:
Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, only one NGO (Melanesian Solidarity)
actually resolved to boycott and picket the proceedings of the Round
Table.
The Round Table was in fact a square table, located in the conference
room of Port Moresby's Islander Hotel. The four sides were occupied
by four different categories of participants. Once the Prime Minister
had concluded his opening address, the top end was reserved for the
Ministers and Secretaries of the government departments which had
some part to play in the implementation of the Plan. Despite the
significance of the occasion, however, it was only the Minister for
Forests, the Honourable Karl Stack, who lasted the whole three days
of discussion, and thus assumed the unlikely role of King Arthur.
Down one side of the table sat the constantly shifting, sometimes
serried, ranks of more junior government officials, amongst whom the
two line departments were noticeably outnumbered by the Prime Minister's
Department (PMD) and the Department of Finance and Planning (DFP).
Facing them, on the other side of the table, sat the unshifting,
unserried ranks of the aid donors, multilateral and bilateral. The
place of Sir Lancelot, immediately to the left of the Honourable Minister,
was taken alternately by the representatives of the World Bank and
the UNDP. At the bottom end of the table, facing the Minister, and
often frowning at him, sat the motley bunch of white knights from
the NGOs, national and international, with a delegation from the University
of PNG uncomfortably but appropriately squeezed into the corner nearest
the exit.
By and large, the Conference adhered to the ritual formalities prescribed
by its agenda: the Government welcomed the Plan, the NGOs expressed
their doubts about it, the donors indicated their interest in funding
different parts of it, and the Honourable Minister wrapped up the
proceedings with a rousing speech. But behind the scenes, in the
backrooms, bars and parlours of the Islander, where the Bank was busily
arranging the customary marriages between donors and recipients, the
NGOs were struggling to bring forth a device that would justify their
own attendance at the ceremony. The Task Force was the product of
their labours.
The proposal to establish the Task Force (Appendix 3) included a recommendation
that no new Timber Permits be granted over any of the 27 areas whose
conservation value had been recognised in the World Bank report (Appendix
2). Some of the NGO participants were possibly surprised, and even
puzzled, when this proposal won the unanimous endorsement of the Round
Table, including the Minister himself. But they were even more surprised
when the Minister went on to announce that he would recommend to Cabinet
the imposition of a two-year moratorium, starting in July 1990, on
the granting of any new Timber Permits and an indefinite moratorium
on the granting of permits for the export of unprocessed logs.
The surprise which greeted the Minister's announcement at the Round
Table was partly due to the World Bank's previously stated disapproval
of such artificial measures. The conservationists did not expect
to find that the Bank's recipe for continued log exports would prove
as unpalatable to the Minister as it was to themselves. And this
was partly because the NGOs present at the Round Table had been internally
divided over the question of whether and how they should express their
own demand for a moratorium in a forum where the Bank's views were
expected to prevail.
In theory, there could be no risk of confusion between the Minister's
motives and those of the conservationists who openly distrusted him
as much as they disliked the economics of the Bank. As Brunton put
it:
The reason why PNG needs to stop exporting logs is not because it
could earn more money by selling processed timber. PNG must stop
exporting logs because logging is out of co [text missing]
way of trumping the NGO card by making the Task Force redundant.
Certainly the nationwide moratorium would entail a very considerable restriction of further logging operations. In its own Medium-Term Development Strategy, published in 1989, the Department of Forests calculated that the national resource would be 'developed' as follows (DOF 1989:127-129):
At the time of the Round Table, Timber Permits had still not been issued for several of the new projects planned for development from 1988 to 1990. Some of these projects, as well as those planned for 1991, were almost certain to impinge on one or other of the 27 'suggested areas for conservation/preservation' listed in Annex 6 of the World Bank report.5 It therefore seemed that the Minister had agreed to the type of moratorium requested by the NGOs - and more besides.Year New Projects Extensions
1988 16 (953,000 ha)4 5 (56,827 ha)
1989 14 (1,625,000 ha) 8 (101,712 ha)
1990 14 (841,000 ha) 6 (571,309 ha)
1991 16 (area unknown)
However, the guarantees were not watertight. To begin with, the Minister allowed that four projects in an 'advanced stage of preparation' would be exempted from the moratorium in order to save the relevant landowners from excessive disappointment.6 These were:
In addition, permits would continue to be issued for extensions to
existing projects, and the Minister did not care to specify a limit
to the quantity or size of these extensions. Nor, of course, could
he be certain that the moratorium would prove acceptable to his own
Cabinet colleagues. And finally, he wanted the Round Table to know
that the moratorium might well elicit a 'backlash' from landowners
whose one great demand was for 'development'.
But in this last respect, the NGOs found that the Minister was once
again climbing into the bed which they already occupied, and again
doing so under the cover of government policy. During his opening
address to the Round Table, the Prime Minister himself had remarked
that:
If this [forest] resource is considered of such high ecological value
to the nation or the world community that it should be fully conserved,
then the villagers should be compensated for the opportunities foregone
by not harvesting it. (Namaliu 1990:3)
The NGOs had no quarrel with this. On the contrary, they had already
mooted the idea of creating a Trust Fund in order to provide financial
incentives for landowners to exercise their 'conservation option'.
But it soon transpired, during the proceedings of the Round Table,
that the idea of 'compensating' landowners for leaving their trees
alone was anathema to the donor agencies. Indeed, this was the main
reason why the NGO submission to the Round Table had to be rewritten
several times before the donors would agree to endorse it. So the
Minister's armour shone once more when he conceded that the donors
could not be expected to 'put money in the pockets of the landowners',
but quickly parried with an insistence that the conservation option
would not be chosen in the absence of some alternative form of rural
development.
Perhaps the greatest source of pride and pleasure to the NGOs was
that they had apparently convinced the Minister to concede the declaration
of Southern New Ireland (Area 23 in Appendix 2) as a priority conservation
area, despite their knowledge that his Department was on the verge
of issuing a Timber Permit for the Lak TRP, which occupied the greater
part of it. This was also something of a surprise, because he had
not shown any comparable reluctance to exempt the Collingwood Bay
project from his moratorium, despite the fact that this would also
impinge on one of the areas which the World Bank had recommended for
World Heritage status (Area 12 in Appendix 2), and despite the fact
that he had just endorsed an NGO proposal to prohibit logging in such
areas.
Be that as it may, the result was a drawn game. The Minister could
declare that his moratorium was a 'signal' to the international community
of his own and his government's good faith in achieving the aims of
the TFAP. When the NGOs persuaded the Round Table to declare Southern
New Ireland a priority conservation area, and the Minister then allowed
the Lak project to be covered by his moratorium, this could be taken
as the crucial test of that good faith.7
These priorities were publicised at a press conference held by the
Minister for Environment and Conservation on the 17th of May, and
by the end of that month, DEC had circulated an itinerary for the
New Ireland expedition, which was to take place between the 11th and
23rd of June. The scope of the expedition had been extended to include
meetings and surveys in Kavieng (the provincial capital), the Umbukul
TRP area on the island of Lavongai (New Hanover), the Lelet Plateau,
and the Danfu Timber Permit areas, as well as the Lak TRP.8
The stated aim of the expedition was 'to propose and promote to the
Provincial Government and local landowners public awareness of the
need for formal environmental planning in the proposed and current
logging areas and also the proposed National Conservation and World
Heritage areas'.
{2}Map 1: PNG Location Map
{3}Map 2: Woodlark Island
{4}Map 3: The Lak Area
{5} This plan was shelved as the result of
advice, from various quarters, that the Lak landowners were thoroughly
hostile to the aims of the Task Force. If Lak would be a hard nut
to crack, and since its cracking was perceived to be a top priority,
there was much to be said for first testing the resources of the Task
Force in a less contentious area. It was therefore decided to postpone
the New Ireland expedition until a visit had first been made to Woodlark
Island, whose population was more likely to be sympathetic.
The eight members of the Team who succeeded in reaching the Subdistrict
Headquarters at Guasopa then spent a total of four nights on the island,
returning to Port Moresby on the 18th.9
From Guasopa, the Team made its way across to Kulumadau (see Map
2), where BHP and Milne Bay Logging (MBL) both maintain base camps
in connection with their respective mineral exploration and timber
extraction activities. From this point, different members of the
Team explored those features of the local environment which were of
special interest to them, but those whose interests included the opinions
of the local villagers reassembled for two major meetings at Kulumadau
on the afternoon of the 16th and then again at Guasopa on the afternoon
of the 17th.
Since the arrival of the Team had been reasonably well publicised,
most of the villages in the Census Division were represented at one
or other of these meetings. In both cases, separate preliminary meetings
were held with the local women, but women also attended the main meeting
at Guasopa. Four of the Team members - Johnson Mantu, Mike Patchett,
David Vosseler and Harry Sakulas - played a prominent role in the
dialogue which occurred at these meetings. Johnson and Mike concentrated
primarily on the importance of conserving the natural environment,
while David and Harry expounded the alternative development options,
like walkabout sawmilling and eco-tourism, which might be chosen in
preference to the destructiveness of large-scale mining and logging.
In both major meetings, especially the second, there was a noticeable
division of public opinion over the relative merits of conservation,
as expounded by the Team, and 'development', as represented by BHP
and MBL. The older generation was largely inclined to accept the
conservationist message, and to deplore some of the destruction already
caused by the activities of the 'developers', while the younger generation
was more acutely divided on this question, reflecting the fact that
both companies have employed a considerable number of young men who
otherwise have little chance of earning a cash income.
Although the Team secured a generally favourable reaction to its message,
some part of this reaction may have been due to the strong sense of
decorum which governs the conduct of public meetings in Milne Bay,
and some was clearly conditional upon the ability of the Task Force
to provide further proof that its 'alternatives' were genuine. Aside
from these considerations, there is one significant respect in which
Woodlark differs radically from most of the areas with which the Task
Force is concerned: much of its surface was alienated from customary
tenure during the early years of the colonial administration, so many,
if not most, of the local villagers are not the legal 'owners' of
the land they use. Some of the villagers who welcomed the intervention
of the Task Force seem to have done so in the hope or expectation
that a programme of 'conservation' would entail the final restoration
of their customary rights, while others suspected, on the contrary,
that it might entail a reassertion of state ownership.
To the best of my knowledge, the only members of the Woodlark Team
who wrote reports of their visit were Michael Young (the anthropologist),
David Vosseler (FSP), and Harry Sakulas (WEI). Michael has provided
a detailed summary of the ethnographic information on Woodlark and
its relationship to the surrounding islands, and has since solicited
the comments of Fred Damon, an American anthropologist who has conducted
two periods of fieldwork in Wabunun village (see Map 2). His report
also makes a number of pertinent observations about local attitudes
to 'development' and the manner in which other Team members addressed
these attitudes (see Young, this volume). David and Harry, as representatives
of local NGOs, were primarily concerned to discuss the possibilities
of developing a range of small-scale enterprises on the island. Unfortunately,
no attempt has been made to integrate these two perspectives.
The Team travelled from Port Moresby to Kavieng on the 26th of August,
and spent the next week travelling the length and breadth of New Ireland
by helicopter, Landcruiser, boat and, finally, on foot. The Team
Leader, Kembi Watoka, failed to catch the plane, so his place was
taken by Johnson Mantu, who had already played a prominent role in
the Woodlark expedition. Thirteen other individuals joined the Team
for some or all of its time in the Province (see Appendix 1), including
a two-man film crew whose aim was to produce and market a TV documentary
on the efforts of the Task Force.
On the morning of the 27th, the Team held a meeting with relevant
provincial officials, chaired by the Administrative Secretary, Ezekiel
Tomon. Provincial politicians were conspicuous by their absence.
Mr Tomon complained that the Province had not been properly informed
about the TFAP or the Task Force, and was interested to know whether
either of these phenomena would generate the funds required to compensate
for recent cuts in the Provincial budget. The Team provided some
information, but could not provide any promises. Mr Tomon lent the
Team a pair of Provincial forestry officials, and then closed the
meeting.
The Team then split in two. One group boarded a Landcruiser and set
off down the Buluminski Highway to monitor established logging operations
and survey potential conservation areas on the mainland of New Ireland.
The other group boarded a helicopter and flew to the island of Lavongai
(New Hanover), to hold the first of a series of village meetings designed
to encourage or persuade local landowners to think twice about the
benefits of logging. After two days of monitoring and surveying,
the first group got bogged down in a muddy hole just north of Silur
Patrol Post (see Map 3), and did not accomplish very much thereafter.
The helicopter enabled the debating team and the film crew to make
greater physical progress through the Lak area, but we also got bogged
down in a metaphysical hole containing the minds of the landowners.
Aside from myself and the film crew, the second group comprised our
Leader, Johnson Mantu, the Director of the Wau Ecology Institute,
Harry Sakulas, and an expert in walkabout sawmilling, Kamung Matrus.
On Lavongai we were accompanied by Debon Logo, the Assistant Secretary
in the Provincial Division of Forests. In Lak his place was taken
by Elvit Remas, another forestry officer who also happened to originate
from the area, and was therefore able to act as an interpreter in
our debates with the landowners.
Despite the expensive luxury of the helicopter, we were only able
to hold a total of five village meetings - two on Lavongai (at Noipuas
and Baungung), three in Lak (at Matkamlagir, Silur and Morukon).10
During our stay in Matkamlagir, some private talks were also held
with the Lak MPA, Ezekiel Waisale, who turned out to be less hostile
(or more devious) than anticipated. And, by an odd stroke of good
luck, the film crew was unintentionally stranded for a night in the
village of Siar, where the villagers promptly mounted a photogenic
ceremonial display.
Generally speaking, it is difficult to maintain that the outcome of
this expedition was worth the K30,000 which was spent on it. Landowners
resisting the issue of the Umbukul TP were certainly given some encouragement
in their struggle, but might have managed just as well without the
intervention of the Task Force, which could not even argue that the
TRP had been designated as a conservation area. In Southern New Ireland,
which had been so designated, there was no comparable resistance in
the landowning community, so the Task Force could only delay the logging
project by appealing to higher authorities and wider audiences. Our
problems in Lak were not unexpected, and were obviously compounded
by the bad weather, but a great deal more might well have been achieved
if so much money had not been spent on simultaneously transporting
such a large and diverse group of experts over such great distances.11
As in the Woodlark case, the only written reports arising from this
exercise appear to be those of the non-government participants. Harry
Sakulas made a record of the most prominent sentiments voiced at our
various meetings, while Kamung Matrus reflected on the economic viability
of walkabout sawmilling in Southern New Ireland. For reasons explained
in Section 3.3 (below), my own 'report' was a newspaper feature article
which discussed the political context of the choice between conservation
and 'development' in Lak (see Filer, this volume). As in the Woodlark
case, no provision was made for integrating the observations of Team
members into a single document with a specific set of recommendations
for further action.
No sooner had the Minister embarked on the task of lengthening his
list of exemptions than another test of his definitional flexibility
presented itself in the shape of 170 ebony logs sitting on a Port
Moresby wharf, awaiting shipment to Japan.13
Customs officers were curious to know whether the four-sided appearance
bestowed upon the logs by the use of axes was evidence of the 'processing'
required for the export of such premium species. While Forestry officials
ruminated on the meaning of the word 'flitch', the Minister boldly
announced that the logs 'could not be exported in their present form'
(Post-Courier 10/4/90). On the next day, the ban was lifted on the
curious grounds that 'the Japanese buyer needed the black wood for
large poles' (Post-Courier 11/4/90).14
Even as the Minister was debating this matter in the pages of the
national newspapers, he was also circulating a draft Cabinet submission
on the moratorium in which the list of proposed exemptions had once
again been altered and extended. For reasons which are not entirely
clear, the Arawe, Gorohu, Inland Pomio and Central New Ireland projects
no longer figured in the list, but eight new projects had been added
to it, including the Lak project in Southern New Ireland.15
It seems the Minister was beginning to experience a little of the
'backlash' which he had mentioned at the Round Table.
Unfortunately, his Cabinet submission did not receive the publicity which might have revealed the particular nature of this pressure, although the media did report some rumblings of discontent about the moratorium from 'landowners' in various parts of the country, especially New Ireland. Perhaps he had reason to be grateful when the Environment Minister, Jim Yer Waim, stole the limelight by promising to suspend a number of established logging operations until the operators produced adequate environmental plans.16 But Minister Waim's tub-thumping seems to have exerted some impact on Cabinet when it agreed to the two-year moratorium at its meeting on the 30th of May, because the list of exempted projects was now cut back to five. These were:
The decision made it perfectly clear that these were the only new
projects for which Timber Permits would be issued after the 23rd
of July, when the moratorium was to take effect.
When, six days later, Cabinet members combined with other dignitaries
to celebrate World Environment Day by planting trees along Kumul Parade,
one might suppose that they were offering symbolic confirmation of
their resolution. But it seems that word of the decision had already
reached the ears of the New Ireland Premier, Pedi Anis, who was not
at all pleased to discover that the list of exemptions did not extend
to a number of new 'developments' in his own province. In this case,
the 'backlash' appears to have consisted of pressure exerted upon
the Minister for Forests by the Minister for Justice, the Honourable
Bernard Narokobi, who was presumably persuaded by Premier Anis that
the future provincial fortunes of their Melanesian Alliance party
depended on the speedy issue of several new Timber Permits.18
At the end of June, Stack was able to advise his ministerial colleague
that 'the Government' had decided to add the Central New Ireland,
Mamirum, Umbukul and Lak projects to the list of exemptions.
From the information available, it appears that this new decision
was made by the Minister himself, not by Cabinet, and was therefore
in breach of Cabinet's previous approval of the moratorium. The decision
was certainly not communicated to the Task Force, let alone the general
public. Indeed, public attention was quickly diverted from developments
in New Ireland by the noise of debate over various timber projects
in Madang Province, where, somewhat ironically, the Minister was able
to cast his own decisions in a much better light.
This debate was triggered by the acrimonious confrontation between
an environmentalist pressure group, Madang Citizens for a Better Environment,
and the 'developmentalist' Madang Premier, Andrew Ariako, who was
accused of misrepresenting or ignoring landowner interests in his
haste to secure the issue of new Timber Permits before the national
moratorium came into effect. Observing that the main bone of contention
was the Josephstaal project, Minister Stack lost no time in dusting
off his suit of shining armour and riding to the defence of the Josephstaal
landowners, claiming (correctly) that there was no need to issue the
Timber Permit without proper consultation because Cabinet had specifically
exempted this project from the moratorium. This point had apparently
not penetrated the mind of the Premier, who openly boasted that he
and his colleagues, in their capacity as 'representatives' of the
landowners, had negotiated and signed a Logging and Marketing Agreement
with Korean company Kosmo Resources in the space of a single Saturday
afternoon, the 30th of June, and were daily expecting the arrival
of the Permit (Post-Courier 3/7/90). Not having been a party to this
arrangement, Minister Stack turned it to his own advantage by uttering
periodic public complaints about the constitution of the 'landowner
company', Josephstaal Development Corporation, in which the Premier
possessed a questionable interest.19
Insofar as these justified an indefinite refusal to issue the Timber
Permit (it has still not been issued) they also served to deflect
attention from the number of other Timber Permits which were still
being processed and issued after the moratorium came into effect.
This strategy was not appreciated by DEC officials engaged in their
own battle to ensure that no new Timber Permits were granted without
their own Minister's approval of the relevant Environmental Plans,
and that Minister Waim himself would not approve these Plans against
the advice of his own Department, which could therefore act as the
ultimate guardian of the moratorium. Their first defeat came on the
25th of September, when Minister Stack issued a Timber Permit for
the North Vanapa project in Central Province. Salt was rubbed in
their wounds when, on the 4th of October, he granted two more, one
for the Sogeram project in Madang, the other for the Inland Pomio
project in East New Britain. Understandably aggrieved, they accused
him of breaching the original Cabinet decision, which had not exempted
any of these projects from the moratorium, as well as the Environmental
Planning Act, because Minister Waim had not yet approved the Plans
for these projects (Post-Courier 22/11/90).
Since Minister Stack had constantly referred to the original list
of exemptions during his skirmishes over the Josephstaal project,
he could no longer resort to his previous tactic of adding new projects
to the list without explicit Cabinet approval. Instead, he produced
a new set of elastic criteria for exempting projects from what he
described as 'the need for exemption' (see Appendix 6).
In the Minister's original undertaking to the Round Table, and also in the Cabinet decision which endorsed this undertaking, there was only one such criterion: the allocation of extensions to existing projects would be allowed to proceed.20 Furthermore, the distinction which DOF officials draw between an 'extension' and a 'new project' is not as flexible as the Minister might have wished. But now he has discovered three other types of project which, in retrospect, did not need to be included in the list of exemptions, namely:
These definitions have all the precision of a sago dumpling. And,
as if these alone were not sufficient to keep the Timber Permits flowing,
the Minister announced, at the beginning of this year, that he would
be seeking Cabinet approval to 'substitute' other new projects for
those, like Josephstaal, which were officially exempted from the moratorium
by Cabinet's earlier decision, but which were 'now having problems'
(Appendix 6).
It is indeed true that only one of the five projects included in Cabinet's
earlier list of exemptions has so far been given any kind of green
light - and that is the Arawe project in West New Britain, part of
which (West Arawe) was approved on the 25th of October. The Minister
has since decided, with or without Cabinet approval, to 'substitute'
the Morobe Coast project for the Cromwell project (also in Morobe),
and contractors were invited to express their interest in the former
project by March of this year. This presumably means that three other
substitutions can still be made before the full-time whistle blows
on the moratorium in 1992.21
It is true that DOF records do make a distinction between 'defunct
projects to be revived' and 'new investment projects' (DOF 1989:126-9),
but the distinction is not a stable one, because of the frequency
with which timber permits have been issued, withdrawn and reissued
with respect to the same TRP. These are the shifting grounds on which
the Minister approved the North Vanapa, Sogeram and Inland Pomio projects
in 1990, and, more recently, the Central New Ireland project (29/1/91)
and the Vailala Block 1 project in Gulf Province (28/2/91).
It is not at all easy to interpret the Minister's own distinction
between projects which have been 'allocated for some time' and those
which are 'ready for allocation', because it is not clear what is
being allocated, nor what point in time divides past allocations from
those which are 'ready'. The most plausible interpretation is that
the first category consists of the two new projects, Gara-Modewa (Central
Province) and Rai Coast (Madang Province) whose Timber Permits were
actually issued between the 4th of April, when the Minister promised
the moratorium, and the 23rd of July, when it was implemented.22
In that case, the second category would comprise all those projects
whose permits were either 'ready' (but not yet issued) at the time
when the moratorium came into effect, or those which, as a result
of further activity, have become 'ready' at any subsequent moment.
This category is apparently designed to embrace all those new projects
which cannot plausibly be 'substituted' for those in the official
list of exemptions. Contractors have recently been invited to 'express
their interest' in one such project (East Kikori) in Gulf Province,
and there are strong rumours that the Minister has recently granted
a Permit for another such project (Embi-Hanao) in Oro Province. But
the first, and most remarkable, of the projects admitted under this
heading is our old friend in Southern New Ireland, the Lak project,
whose Permit was issued by the Minister on the 7th of December last
year.
The twisted history of the Lak Timber Permit perfectly illustrates
the obscurity of the Minister's reasoning. As we have seen, Lak was
not one of the four projects which the Minister proposed to exempt
from the moratorium when he first mooted the concept to the Round
Table. And this was certainly not because the Lak TP was then 'ready
for allocation' and therefore 'did not need exemption'. On the contrary,
the four projects which did need exemption at that time, according
to the Minister himself, were precisely those which were 'ready for
allocation', and although it may be true that the Lak TP was as 'ready'
as the four which the Minister listed, he was actually persuaded not
to include Lak in the list because it was part of a proposed World
Heritage Area. Although he subsequently changed his mind, he clearly
still thought that the project 'needed exemption', because he included
it in the longer list of exemptions submitted to Cabinet. But Lak
was one of the projects which Cabinet did not agree to exempt when
it imposed the moratorium. Even then, the Minister still thought,
for a time, that it 'needed exemption', because he told the Justice
Minister that it was one of the four New Ireland projects which had
somehow been added to the list approved by Cabinet. Only later did
he make the convenient discovery that Cabinet had not exempted projects
beacuse they were 'ready for allocation', but for some entirely different
reason, the nature of which has never been revealed. The best that
can be said is that, in this one case, Minister Stack delayed his
issue of the Timber Permit until one day after Minister Waim had approved
the Environmental Plan for the project. But, by that time, Minister
Waim's resolve had been diluted to the same watery consistency as
Minister Stack's excuses.23
In view of this bizarre sequence of decisions, it is interesting to
consider the points made by the Forests Minister in one of his press
releases late last year:
The fact of the matter is that my ministry is implementing the moratorium
in spite of the political (both provincial and national) and landowners'
pressure to allow more projects to be developed... In spite of daily
lobbying and visits by landowners and politicians to the Department
of Forests and my ministry, we are strongly honouring the moratorium
and our advice to them has been that until its expiry in 1992 the
moratorium must stand... I would like to make it clear it was at
my own initiative that the moratorium has been imposed and it would
be ridiculous if I were now to contradict it by allowing more projects
than the ones exempted. (Post-Courier 11/12/90; see also Appendix
6)
Since the Minister has never seen fit to reveal the identity of the
projects which he has not approved because they are covered by the
moratorium, it is difficult to establish the criteria by which he
has been dealing, on a daily basis, with the queues of 'landowners
and politicians' at his office door. Given the number of years which
normally pass between the demarcation of a TRP and the removal of
the trees which it contains, it is equally difficult to believe that
there is any such project whose Timber Permit might conceivably have
been allocated before July 1992, with or without the moratorium.
But there is a genuine problem here. Why did the Minister bother to promote the idea of a moratorium if he had little or no intention of abiding by it?
Without another Commission of Inquiry, we may never know the answer
to these questions.
This was one of several tussles between DFP, DEC and the NGOs which came to be aired at meetings of the TFAP (subsequently NFAP) Steering Committee, a body which was established in August 1990 to coordinate the planning and implementation of all TFAP projects.24 At the first meeting, DFP was persuaded to accept the Task Force as a legitimate project, mainly by virtue of the argument that it could be seen as a curtain-raiser for the offical project on the 'Strategy, Design and Implementation of Conservation and World Heritage Areas' (Appendix 5). But the onus was then placed on DEC to produce Terms of Reference for the Task Force that would demonstrate the nature of this link. The Terms of Reference (originally constructed in April) were duly presented at the second meeting of the Committee (Appendix 4). They now proved unacceptable to DFP because:
DEC was therefore asked to amend the Terms of Reference to avoid these unpleasant obscurities, and the amended version was duly brought to the fourth meeting of the Committee.
DFP was still not wholly satisfied, so the Committee adopted the ancient
bureaucratic practice of accepting the proposal in principle but withholding
actual approval while the two departments sorted out their differences.
For many months, the Committee heard nothing of the outcome, and,
until very recently, the DFP's Office of International Development
Assistance (OIDA) has consequently refused to make a formal request
for additional Task Force funding.25
As a result of this stalemate, the Task Force simply ran out of money.
The trips to Woodlark Island and New Ireland consumed over 80% of
the US$50,000 (about K48,000) initially donated by the World Wildlife
Fund. After other minor costs had been met, there was only K3,500
left to pay for the return visits which had been promised to the landowners
in both locations, let alone visits to new areas. A total of about
K220,000 had been made available in separate undertakings by USAID
and AIDAB, but the release of these funds awaited the request which
did not come from OIDA.26
However, the effectiveness of the Task Force is not simply a function
of the amounts of money which have or have not been injected into
it over the past year, but also depends on the manner in which that
money has been, and might have been, spent. To judge by the experience
to date, especially the outing to New Ireland, short visits to obscure
places by large and diverse groups of experts are not a cost-effective
way of achieving the aims of the Task Force. Too much time is spent
in first-class hotels and chartered aircraft; too little time is spent
with the landowners whose needs and views are criticial to the outcome
of the exercise. The preference for expeditions of this kind reflects
established bureaucratic practice; it also reflects the fact that
team members have not been hired to complete a particular task, but
have voluntarily taken time out from their normal occupations in order
to participate, and do not have the additional spare time required
to convert their observations into plans for further action. Reports
have not been written, return visits have not been made, benefit packages
have not been designed. Task Force meetings in the capital have not
been consistently attended by the same group of individuals, have
not established a clear set of priorities, and have not managed to
escape from discussion of routine administrative matters - especially
the matter of the missing money.
To some extent, these problems have been recognised and addressed
in the Task Force budgets produced in anticipation of the funds promised
by USAID and AIDAB. In the first-year budget which accompanied the
project proposal submitted to the Steering Committee in October last
year (Appendix 4), K40,500 was dedicated to the employment and housing
of a full-time Executive Officer, K57,900 to the engagement of local
consultants, and K4,800 to miscellaneous local employment. Taken
together, these sums exceeded the K90,600 dedicated to local travel
and accommodation.
But one of the main reasons why DFP has been unwilling to request
the extra money is that FSP, apparently supported by the other NGOs,
has consistently argued that it should be able to appoint an Executive
Officer of its own choice, and then assume full responsibility for
administering the affairs of the Task Force. DFP seems to have taken
the view that all individuals receiving salaries under the auspices
of the NFAP, including the Task Force Executive Officer, must be public
servants. The irony of this policy, in the present instance, is that
it had the effect of eliminating the grant of K60,000 promised by
USAID, which was specifically intended to pay for this position to
be established as part of FSP's administration of the Task Force,
because USAID would not permit this money to be diverted into the
public purse. And that is one of the main reasons why the NGOs are
so intensely aggravated by the whole affair.
The compromise which accompanied the Steering Committee's final approval
of the project was that DEC would recruit the Executive Officer to
one of its own vacant positions, thus deleting this person's salary
from the Task Force budget. The latest version of the budget envisages
the spending of K525,550 over a two year period (1991-2), and the
sums set aside each year for 'local consultancies' and 'local employment'
have been raised to K60,000 and K6,000 respectively. The Executive
Officer's 'accommodation' is still included in the budget (at K15,000
a year), as if to entice applications from public servants who normally
lack this perk.27
Administrative costs (calculated at 15% of the remaining items in
the budget) are still to be allocated to FSP.
Despite this compromise, the underlying problem has not been resolved.
The problem is that this Task Force, like others before it, has already
come to resemble a mobile inter-departmental government committee,
and if it retains this organisational form, whatever the shape of
its budget, it is unlikely to produce anything more remarkable than
inter-departmental communications.
As matters stand, the only government department which has a vested
interest in the stated aims of the Task Force is DEC. DOF is represented
by an individual whose personal sympathy with these aims is certainly
not matched by the support of his departmental colleagues. The DME
representatives are primarily there to ensure that the Task Force
does not inadvertently discourage the process of mineral exploration.
The interests of other departments are not so clearly expressed,
because their representatives are generally absent. But, while this
has given DEC the upper hand, in terms of numbers, its own officers
have signally failed to develop a clear and consistent division of
roles and responsibilities amongst themselves. This is not entirely
surprising, because the organisational weakness of DEC is the target
of a separate NFAP project which has yet to be implemented. But,
even if DEC were better able to perform its coordinating function,
its officers would still be in the business of monitoring, regulating,
and sometimes obstructing, the process of 'development'. They would
not be expected to possess the experience necessary to design and
(above all) deliver those alternative forms of development which local
landowners are demanding of the Task Force. That is why FSP does
not regard DEC as the best place from which to recruit a Task Force
Executive Officer.
The donors who have shown interest in funding the Task Force (and
other NGO initiatives) are well aware of the nature of this problem.
So is the World Bank, which is not immune to the wealth of criticism
which NGOs themselves have levelled at the TFAP track record (see
Winterbottom 1990). Even the bureaucrats in Waigani have acknowledged
the need to establish some 'mechanism' whereby the local NGOs can
eat from the Government's hand without treading on the Government's
toes. The NFAP Steering Committee agreed last year that a sub-committee
should be formed to look into this matter, but DFP could not decide
whether the 'lead role' should be assigned to OIDA (which is responsible
for the money) or to the Social Affairs Division (which is responsible
for the NGOs). The sub-committee has never met.
My experience of the Task Force trip to New Ireland last August convinced
me that the only chance of keeping the bulldozers and chainsaws out
of the Lak area was to generate a level of public awareness which
would make the politicians think twice before they jumped into the
pockets of the logging contractor. At the Task Force meeting immediately
following this trip, on the 3rd of September, I suggested that an
exercise in publicity would be the most effective way of using of
my own observations as a social scientist, especially considering
that I was not a public servant.28
This suggestion was accepted, on the understanding that the contents
of the article would need to be approved by other members of the Task
Force.
The first part of the article was accordingly produced, circulated, and then submitted to the Times of PNG on the 17th of September, after the Editor had been advised of its urgency and significance. The weekly Times was chosen in preference to the daily Post-Courier because:
Unfortunately, instead of publishing my article, or even reading it
properly, the journalists on the Times decided to treat it as a press
release. On the 20th of September, the newspaper carried a front-page
story under the headline 'Stack Says Yes, Yer Waim No', in which it
was claimed that Minister Stack had already issued the Lak Timber
Permit, while Minister Waim had already rejected the Lak Environmental
Plan.
These claims were not simply untrue, they also negated the entire
purpose of the original article, which had been carefully crafted
to avoid any premature comment on the choices which had not yet been
made. And, since the Task Force was cited as the source of this false
news, the capacity of its bureaucratic members to influence these
choices was instantly reduced.
On the day following the publication of this story, the Task Force
met again, and decided that the only way to remedy the situation was
to try and ensure that the Times published the original article as
soon as possible. This point was duly communicated to the journalists
involved. At the end of the following week, when the first part had
still not appeared, I completed and submitted the entire piece, and
left the country for a period of seven weeks. But when I returned,
late in November, the article was still languishing on the spike,
while the Times had been publishing other academic features on the
price of corned beef and similar momentous issues.
The day of reckoning for Lak was fast approaching. The question now
was whether publication of the article would make the slightest difference.
I gave it one last shot, but this time asked the Times to describe
me as a 'special correspondent', simply to avoid the embarrassment
of seeming to be out of touch with the progress of events. But the
progress of events moved on, the article still failed to appear, Minister
Waim approved the Environmental Plan, and Minister Stack issued the
Timber Permit. I then advised the Times that the article was redundant,
and should not now be published under any circumstances. On the 3rd
and the 10th of January they published the article.
In retrospect, it is hard to say whether the whole idea of trying
to develop public awareness in this way had been a mistake, or whether
this particular attempt had been the victim of erratic journalistic
practices. If the article had been submitted to the Post-Courier,
which is certainly a more professional outfit, one might suppose that
it would either have been published fairly quickly or not published
at all. At the same time, all journalists prefer sensational front-page
stories to diplomatic feature articles, whether they get their facts
right or not, and the Task Force is in no position to ensure that
its own communications to the press, whatever their form, will not
be sensationalised. This is a problem in its own right because the
Task Force is a semi-official body, whose mandate to seek publicity
for its cause is as questionable as the relationship between its government
and non-government members. But if we assume that the Task Force
has the right and the need to promote some public awareness of its
activities, I would still argue that 'newsworthy' attacks on politicians
are not always the most effective way of altering their behaviour.
There is no way of knowing whether timely publication of my article
would have had the intended impact on the decision-making process.
It is perhaps unlikely. Nevertheless, I suggest that the type of
'understanding' approach which I tried to adopt in that article is
more likely, in the long run, to promote the type of public awareness
which will make it easier for politicians to make the right decisions.
Those who think it does have possibly been misled by the populist
form of political debate in PNG, where everyone falls over themselves
to champion the 'grassroots' in their endlessly heroic struggle to
secure justice from whichever bunch of self-serving 'elites' happens
to be running the government of the day. From this point of view,
the fate of the forests hangs in the balance of a struggle between
a corrupt cabal of contractors and politicians, on the one side, and
on the other side the vast mass of local landowners who, in their
innocence or naivety, are continually cheated of their natural inheritance.
In that case, the economics of conservation boil down to the cost
of mounting landowner awareness campaigns.
There are a number of salient facts which do not square with this conception of the matter:
When Minister Stack complains about the queues of 'landowners and
politicians' outside his office door, he is not engaging in a piece
of fanciful rhetoric.29
It may well be true that their visits to the capital are funded by
the logging contractors who lurk in the nooks and crannies of nearby
hotels. The less obvious, but no less important, truth is that these
queues are not made up of two separate categories of people. They
are made up of people who are both landowners and politicians, who
are not unrepresentative of the wider populace, and whose concern
for the environment bears no comparison with the contents of their
pockets.
This is not to deny that there have been instances of conflict between
landowner groups and logging companies, in which 'politicians' are
often the favourite target of abuse, and environmental damage is one
of the favourite pretexts for complaint. Recent battles between Gogol-Naru
landowners and the Jant company in Madang Province are a notable example.
Nor can one deny the mountain of evidence which Judge Barnett assembled
to demonstrate that many local landowners have been systematically
'ripped off' by the corrupt association of their so-called leaders
with the loggers. However, the connection between these phenomena
is not as simple as it may appear.
The paradox is that, generally speaking, landowner resistance to logging
projects has been very limited when compared to the protests raised
against actual or proposed mining projects, where the economic benefits
to landowners are undoubtedly far greater, and it is not at all obvious
that there is any corresponding increase in the negative environmental
impact.
There are several ways of explaining this paradox. For example, it may be argued that:
But, in view of the points already made in this section, there is another group of explanations which may carry more weight, and which do not bode so well for the objectives of the Task Force:
Education alone is most unlikely to compensate for such a mixture
of material motives. What this means, very simply, is that the Task
Force (and the NFAP) will not get very far with forest conservation
unless it counters one material incentive with another.
The international community has recognised this fact by conceding the need to supplement 'landowner awareness' with 'benefit packages'. The problem now is to work out the correct rate of exchange between these two commodities. The Task Force has hardly begun to address this problem, but even from its limited encounters with the villagers of Milne Bay and New Ireland, one may observe some reasons why this task will not be straightforward:
In view of the amount of hot air generated by this aspect of its terms
of reference (Appendix 4), it is hard to say how far the Task Force
will be able (or allowed) to proceed with the design of these 'benefit
packages'. But whatever effort it takes to make them presentable
to 'the government' may also may also have the unintended effect of
making them less acceptable to 'the landowners'.
These signs of internal renovation have been accompanied by some positive developments in the political and bureaucratic environment of the Task Force:
It is therefore an opportune moment to consider what lessons may be
learnt from the experiences of the Task Force as the would-be spearhead
of the conservation programme within the NFAP, and what steps might
now be taken to ensure that its time and money are more productively
spent.
There is no element of surprise in the discovery that PNG government
ministers are inconsistent and unreliable in the exercise of their
portfolios, or that political decisions have no discernible basis
in the 'policies' or 'parties' which pretend to inhabit the PNG political
system. It may be an interesting exercise to document the brief history
of Minister Stack's 'moratorium', as I have done in this paper, but
the Task Force should not waste more time in futile attempts to defend
this strange creature from annihilation. There may be more mileage
in attempts to ensure that the Environment Minister makes full use
of his power under the Environmental Planning Act, but experience
has shown that this minister (like his department) can rarely do more,
and often does less, than beat a tactical retreat from the encompassing
demands for 'development'. In this context, the Task Force should
acknowledge a distinction between the routine business of delaying
and qualifying the approval of EPs for logging projects and those
particular cases, or particular moments, in which the Minister can
be persuaded that his own political career will be promoted if he
makes a public fuss. This means that the Task Force needs to develop
a strategic sense of its own priorities, so that these windows of
opportunity can be anticipated and exploited with the maximum effectiveness.
The final approval of the Task Force project proposal may signify
the removal of one major bureaucratic obstacle to its work. But this
should not give rise to a premature sense of elation. The Task Force
has been left with an administrative structure which contains a public
servant consuming funds and facilities allocated to an NGO, which
is surely a recipe for confusion. The fact that its budget includes
allocations to 'consultants' and 'local employees' may not mean that
this money can be spent without the usual battle between the relevant
line department (in this case DEC) and the Department of Personnel
Management, nor can it be assumed that DEC knows how to win these
battles.32 And even
if victory is achieved on this front, there is still a pressing need
to draw some line between the specialised activities of consultants
and employees and the routine practices of those Task Force members
who are public servants.
What lesson can be learnt from the failure of my personal attempt
to promote public awareness of the Task Force through the pages of
the local newspapers (Section 3.3 above)? DEC officials seem to have
drawn the conclusion that newspapers should be avoided altogether.
No press releases should be issued; no feature articles should be
written. It is understandable that public servants should take this
attitude. But if we deny ourselves these avenues of publicity, is
public awareness of Task Force activites to be promoted by meetings
alone, and if so, meetings with whom? It is true that the latest
Task Force budget includes an allocation of K50,000 over two years
to something called 'photographic and video' (awareness program).
But, to the best of my knowledge, there has not been any proper discussion
of the contribution which these visual images are intended to make
to the achievement of our aims. If public servants have good reason
to regard publicity as an obstacle to their own endeavours, the non-government
members of the Task Force should perhaps take it upon themselves to
devise and implement a programme of public awareness which makes optimum
use of all available media.
Landowners, of course, are an unavoidable 'obstacle' to the achievement
of our aims. But, as previously indicated, some landowners are more
of an obstacle than others. What the Task Force presently lacks is
a way of deciding which landowners are an obstacle to be avoided,
and which landowners are an obstacle to be confronted. The reason
for this is that the Task Force has not yet found a way of incorporating
landowner attitudes into its definition of a 'priority forest area'.
It is true that Southern New Ireland (including Lak) was granted a very high priority by the resolution which established the Task Force (Appendix 3). There were two clear reasons for this:
The immediacy of this threat has since been demonstrated by the issue of the Lak Timber Permit. But, now that the TP has been granted, we are left with two vital questions:
Of course, the granting of the TP does not have the effect of instantly
wiping out the conservation value of the whole area, because one logging
company can only cause a certain amount of damage in any one year,
the Lak EP has only received conditional approval for a period of
two years, and logging operations in the TRP have not yet started,
apparently because of continuing factional disputes within the landowning
community. On the other hand, this creates a situation in which
the Task Force will find it very difficult to arrange 'benefit packages'
which are not perceived as forms of retribution against those villages,
like Matkamlagir and Morukon, whose land is due to be logged in the
next two years.
Unlike the Lak TRP, Woodlark Island was not recommended as a potential
World Heritage area in the World Bank report. It was not even included
in any of the 27 proposed conservation areas. Since these 27 areas
are only vaguely defined and described in the World Bank report (Appendix
2), their listing does not have to be regarded as holy writ. But
Woodlark seems to have been granted its priority status as a result
of the idiosyncratic interest of a single individual in a particular
species of cuscus (Phalanger orientalis lullulae), which happened
to coincide with a brief public debate over the merits of allowing
the export of ebony 'flitches' from the island.33
The cuscus and the ebony both figure in the answers which Task Force
members gave to the question 'Why conserve Woodlark?' at their last
meeting, but the tourist potential of the island and the positive
attitudes of the islanders have evidently underlined its priority.
It may also be argued that the Task Force is now committed to maintaining
an interest in the area by virtue of the hopes and expectations raised
by its initial visit.
In the course of our very expensive expedition to New Ireland, Task
Force members visited a number of areas apart from the Lak TRP, but
the nature of our interest in these areas has not been clarified.
The Lelet Plateau, for example, received some scant attention: it
is included in the list of 27 areas, and is also included in the Central
New Ireland TRP, for which a Timber Permit was granted at the start
of this year, but no-one has so far suggested that it is a priority
area, presumably because it is inaccessible to the loggers. The Umbukul
TRP was the object of rather more attention, despite its exclusion
from the list of 27 areas, apparently because the landowning community
was divided on the subject of logging, and the grant of a Timber Permit
would have been a breach of the national moratorium. In this case,
the role of the Task Force was presumably to give moral support to
the local opponents of logging, and this was not meant to foreshadow
a more permanent interest in the area. It may also be argued that
the Task Force should sustain a general interest in forestry and conservation
issues throughout New Ireland, because of the extent to which the
forests and the politics of this particular province have already
been degraded by dubious logging contractors (see Filer, this volume).
In view of its limited resources, and the limited period of time for
which it is expected to operate, there is an obvious risk that the
Task Force may cast its net too widely, and in this way dilute its
chances of achieving significant results in any one area. On the
other hand, in view of the commitments already made to Woodlark and
Lak, there is also a risk that these will prove to be the only significant
experiments which the Task Force conducts. In either case, there
is an obvious need to reflect more carefully on the criteria which
are being used to assess the relative priority of different areas.
To judge by the record of Task Force discussions to date, there are four such criteria in use:
The original mandate of the Task Force focusses on the first two criteria.
Lak is the top priority because it has unusual conservation value
and is immediately threatened by logging operations. The trouble
is that landowner attitudes in Lak are not conducive to the conservation
of the area precisely because there is no previous experience of logging,
only a great expectation of it, and this in turn reduces the current
potential for alternative forms of development in the area. This
is not a paradox; it represents a normal and predictable relationship
between the criteria in our list. How then do we 'trade off' the
weight of one criterion against another when deciding the amount of
time and effort to devote to any given area?34
The Task Force cannot escape the task of answering this question.
Leaving aside the routine work of Task Force administration, most of which should now become the province of our full-time Executive Officer, our contributions are of three main types:
Hitherto we have spent too much of our time on discussions which have
not resulted in clear decisions, or in productive communications with
other agencies, because we have not organised a coherent series of
investigations that would yield the basis for such decisions.
To rectify this deficiency, I now suggest a procedure for dealing
with 'priority forest areas', in which a succession of relevant decisions
alternates with a series of specialised activities which are the outcome
of the last decision and provide the input to the next.
The first decision is to declare that a particular area is enough of a 'priority' to warrant further investigation. The inputs to this decision should include:
This first decision should be understood as a provisional decision,
in the sense that it does not commit the Task Force to assign any
particular degree of priority to the area in question, and does not
warrant the discussion of 'benefit packages' with local landowners.
Two fieldwork exercises should follow from this initial decision:
These two exercises do not have to be carried out simultaneously,
because they clearly involve very different forms of data collection,
and it might even be advisable to insist on their separation in order
to maintain a low profile.
I am not in a position to say what resources are required for the
first type of fieldwork, but the second should be undertaken by a
single expert in rapid rural appraisal, accompanied by no more than
one government official, whose time in the field would be determined
by the size and distribution of the target population. The terms
of reference for this exercise would clearly prohibit the investigator
from giving any undertakings to local landowners on behalf of the
Task Force or any government agency. It might be difficult to avoid
all mention of the Task Force, but at this stage the Task Force should
be represented only as an organisation which is interested in promoting
the idea of conservation.
Although I have suggested that a single expert should be able to produce
the socio-economic appraisal of a target area, it is too much to expect
this expert to produce a sensible discussion of the local feasibility
of those 'alternative developments' which might be wrapped up in a
'benefit package' without the provision of an additional input, which
might best be described as a review of potential package ingredients,
or alternative development strategies. It is all very well to promote
the self-evident merits of walkabout sawmilling, butterfly farming,
eco-tourism, and so forth, but it is very difficult to assess the
viability of such schemes within a particular location if there is
no way of gaining ready access to a review of the successes and failures
of such schemes in other places, especially places in PNG. Ideally,
this review should be incorporated into the inventory, whose production
should then be regarded as another specialised Task Force activity.
Initial fieldwork in the target area should result in the production
of two written reports which provide the basis upon which the Task
Force makes its second decision with regard to that area. The subject
of this second decision should be the degree of 'priority' which the
Task Force will henceforth assign to this area, as measured by the
amount of additional resources to be spent on it.
If this amount is anything much greater than zero, this second decision would be followed by two further activities:
In practice, there would obviously be more of an overlap between these
two activities than there was between the two initial forms of fieldwork
in the area. However, while the first activity apparently falls within
the routine competence of public servants already participating in
the Task Force, the second is likely to require some more specialised
input than they can provide.
In the same way that a review of potential package ingredients is
required as a general input to the initial socio-economic appraisal
of a target area, it can be argued that another general input is required
at this second stage of activity, which is a review of options for
organising landowners to receive these packages. It cannot be assumed
that landowners will spontaneously organise themselves around the
declaration of a conservation area in a manner which will make them
properly accountable for the receipt of any material incentives and
discourage factional disputes over the distribution of those in incentives.
Indeed, there is a wealth of evidence from a variety of economic
sectors to indicate that the distribution of revenues (such as royalties)
arising from customary ownership of a natural resource has always
been a problem in PNG, and has given rise to a remarkable variety
of solutions, some of which have been notably more successful than
others.35
It is difficult to be more specific about the manner in which these
second-stage negotiations and investigations should proceed until
the Task Force has clarified the limits of its own capacity to design
the 'packages' and the NGOs have clarified the nature and extent of
their ability to deliver them, with or without the support of relevant
government agencies. Until these outstanding questions are resolved,
it is equally difficult to describe the timing and content of any
third decision which the Task Force may need to make about the target
area. But if we manage to get to the point where a third decision
has to be made, we shall already have made a great deal of progress.
Much of the work of mapping the 27 recommended conservation areas
has already been undertaken by UPNG staff and students. The costs
of this exercise (about K5,000 to date) have partly been covered by
a grant from Conservation International, while the rest has been borne
by the University itself. The next step is to integrate these 'conservation
maps' with maps of TRP boundaries and the 'forest working plans' of
relevant Timber Permit areas at a national, provincial and local level.
The Task Force has to decide whether to intervene in this process,
by allocating or securing funds for its continuation, or to wait for
other agencies to do the necessary work on their own initative or
under the auspices of another NFAP project.
A similar decision has to be made in respect of the other two general inputs which I have described as essential ingredients of Task Force deliberations:
Both of these may be treated as 'one-off' consultancies, whose output
may then be updated or revised in the light of experience in particular
target areas, but the first probably requires the active involvement
of NANGO as an organisation, and the nature of this involvement needs
to be specified with some care.
If these general inputs could be organised and funded outside of the current Task Force budget, then the funds already earmarked for 'consultancies' could be directed at the three types of investigation required for each 'priority area':
In these cases, government regulations might (for once) work to the
advantage of the Task Force, by forcing it to economise. These regulations
specify that government agencies cannot contract consultants for sums
of more than K5,000 without referring the matter to the Consultancy
Steering Committee (convened by the Department of Personnel Management),
with an explanation of why it should not be put out to tender. This
is a complicated process, and one which has seemingly defeated the
best brains in DEC, but the Task Force might be well advised to impose
its own limit of K5,000 of any one investigation of any one target
area, even if the funding is not constrained by these particular regulations.36
If Task Force consultancy funds were spent in this way, then a maximum
of K15,000 would spent on special investigations in any one area,
and the Task Force should be able to 'cover' five or six such areas
in the space of a single year.37
To judge by the experiences of the first year, this would probably
be the limit of its organisational capacity, even with the presence
of a full-time Executive Officer.
Consultants working in this way would only consume a small proportion
of the funds (K100,000 per annum) which the Task Force has budgetted
for 'travel and accommodation'. From this one might infer that the
remainder of the travel funds (perhaps K80,000) would be spent in
the course of 'negotiations' between Task Force members, local landowners
and government agencies, as indeed they have been over the past year.
If this means that our bureaucratic members are going to spend a
lot of time in chartered aircraft and expensive hotels, one can only
ask that their motions do not interfere with the conduct of those
specialised activities which have so far been neglected.
{6}References
Barnett, T.E., 1989. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Aspects
of the Forest Industry (20 volumes). Boroko.
Brunton, B.D., 1990. 'Critique of the World Bank's Tropical Forestry
Action Plan Review for Papua New Guinea.' Boroko: Law Reform Commission
(Working Paper 26).
Filer, C., 1990. 'The Eyes of the World Are on Lak.' Times of PNG
3-10/1/91. Reprinted in this volume.
Matrus, K., 1990. 'TFAP New Ireland Forests Action Plan Taskforce
Visit Report: Small Scale Timber Industry.' Mimeo.
Namaliu, R.L., 1990. 'Opening Address by the Prime Minister...for
the Tropical Forest Action Plan Round Table Conference.' Mimeo.
New Guinea Island Campaign Group et al., 1990. 'The World Bank Tropical
Forestry Action Plan for Papua New Guinea: A Critique.' Mimeo.
Papua New Guinea, Department of Forests, 1989. 'The Medium Term Development
Strategy for the Forestry Sub-Sector 1990-1994.' Hohola.
Papua New Guinea, Department of Forests, 1990. 'Project Proposals
for the Tropical Forestry Sector Action Program (TFAP).' Hohola.
Pearce, F., 1990. 'High Stakes in the Rainforest.' The Guardian
(UK) 19/10/90.
Sakulas, H., 1990a. 'Proposed Woodlark World Heritage Area.' Mimeo.
Sakulas, H., 1990b. 'Task Force on Conservation and World Heritage
Areas: Lak Area Southern New Ireland Trip.' Mimeo.
Vosseler, D., 1990. 'NGO Report on the Task Force Mission to Woodlark
Island.' Mimeo.
Winterbottom, R., 1990. Taking Stock: The Tropical Forestry Action
Plan After Five Years. Washington DC: World Resources Institute.
Woodlark Island Development Corporation, 1990. Environmental Plan
for Timber Harvesting on Woodlark Island.
World Bank, 1990. Papua New Guinea, The Forestry Sector: A Tropical
Forestry Action Plan Review (2 volumes). Washington DC.
Young, M.W., 1990. 'TFAP Task Force Visit to Woodlark Island, 14-18 June 1990: Sociological Report.' Mimeo. Reprinted this volume.
This list only includes those Members (M) and Alternate Members (A)
who actually attended Task Force meetings during its first year of
existence and those individuals who took part in the expeditions to
Woodlark (W) and New Ireland (N).
NAME (ROLE) AFFILIATION
Stephen BABO (A) Nature Conservation Division, DEC
Paul BARKER (M) Economic Adviser, PMD
Lafcadio CORTESI (W) Greenpeace
Phillie DAUR (W) Biology Dept, UPNG
John DOUGLAS (M) Environment Division, DEC
Colin FILER (AN) Dept of Anthropology & Sociology, UPNG
Philip HUGHES (M) Environmental Sciences Programme, UPNG
Guy KULA (MN) Nature Conservation Division, DEC
Tau LEGAI (N) First Take Productions Pty
Debon LOGO (N) Division of Forests, Dept of New Ireland Province
Johnson MANTU (MWN) Task Force Unit, DOF
Anna MARIKAWA (M) Social Affairs Division, DFP
Kamung MATRUS (AN) Village Development Trust
Paul MILLIN (MN) Dept of Surveying & Land Studies, PNG University of Technology
Titi NAGARI (MN) Environmental Planning & Assessment Section, DEC
Gerard NATERA (MN) Bureau of Water Resources, DEC
Mike PATCHETT (MW) Environment Division, DEC
Larry QUEEN (A) Geological Survey, DME
Vaughan REDFERN (M) Department of Agriculture & Livestock
Elvit REMAS (N) Division of Forests, Dept of New Ireland Province
Dale RUTSTEIN (N) First Take Productions Pty
Harry SAKULAS (MWN) Wau Ecology Institute
Lester SERE (M) Nature Conservation Division, DEC
Kevin VANG (W) Legal Adviser, DEC
David VOSSELER (MW) Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific
Adam WANGU (N) Geological Survey, DME
Kembi WATOKA (M) Environmental Division, DEC
Richard WEST (MN) Project Coordination Branch, DME
Michael YOUNG (W) Dept of Anthropology, Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU
The following list of areas was contained as Annex 6 in Volume 2 of
the World Bank's Tropical Forestry Action Plan Review for PNG. It
has also been reproduced as an Appendix to the project description
for the Task Force, a version of which is attached here as Appendix
4. The areas listed are an addition to the total of approximately
700,000 hectares which is already occupied by National Parks and Wildlife
Management Areas, and the combination is intended to provide a better
coverage of the range of botanical and zoological diversity in PNG.
It is estimated that this combination represents 15-20% of PNG's
46 million hectares of land.
(1) On the Huon Peninsula, Morobe Province, a World Heritage Area
is proposed. It should include the summit areas of Mt. Bangeba (limestone),
the terraces of the Huon Peninsula, and a broad area to its southern
coast. This area includes ranges of Bird of Paradise species, especially
Astrapia rothschildi and Paradisaea guilielmi, both of which are endemic
to the Huon Peninsula. Plant communities in forests of this area
are of particular interest. Dahl (1986:28) has mentioned this area
as a proposed National Park.
(2) At Morobe coast and Mt. Missim a combined Marine and Terrestrial
Reserve is proposed. The coastal area is important with an extreme
beauty of its landscape, the inland areas having unique forests on
ultrabasic parent material. The reserve needs to extend along the
ranges to include Mt. Missim so as to protect diverse plant habitats
and a rich bird and insect fauna.
(3) At the Bismarck Falls a World Heritage Area of extreme conservation
and scientific interest is proposed, sharing itself into the Madang,
Eastern Highlands and Chimbu Provinces. It should include the area
from the Ramu to the summit regions of Mt. Otto and Mt. Wilhelm and
is to extend to the Gahavisuka Provincial Park NE of Goroka. The
area would need to be fragmented in southern sections from Bundi to
Gembogl and to exclude the chromite deposits of ultrabasics near the
Ramu. Areas of Lauterbachia (Monimiaceae) should be included since
they represent an endemic genus only known from this region. There
are many other endemic plants and a very rich bird life. The park
would range from 300m to the summit of Mt. Wilhelm at 4,000m.
(4) The Okapa Araucaria stands in the Eastern Highlands Province should
be protected since it belongs to the lower montane zone, which is
the most threatened one in the country. The proposed area has a larger
natural stand of Araucaria which at the same time is the habitat of
PNG's National Emblem, the Paradisaea raggiana.
(5) A National Park at Mt. Giluwe in the Southern Highlands Province
is proposed, including a mountain region of considerable beauty and
exceptional botanical interest. Several high altitude species of
Bird of Paradise are common here. The area also includes the most
extensive high altitude past bogs in PNG with their distinctive flora,
i.e. mat forming Rhododendrons and many high altitude plants of specific
conservation interest. The Park should be extended to include areas
of forest dominated by Nothofagus grandis and N.pollei, locally known
as 'Karapeh karapeh' and 'Karapah pu', and areas dominated by celery
top pine Phyllocladus hyppophyllus. The area is very rich in plant
and animal species, including an unnamed giant Water Rat and six other
Rat species. It also supports one of the few remaining Wild Dog populations.
(6) At Tari Gap in the Southern Highlands Province a Park could be
established covering a mid to high altitude area. It is easily accessible
as the road from Mendi to Tari passes through subalpine forest at
an altitude of about 3,000m. The area which is very diverse botanically
and zoologically should include the Doma Peak with the moutains of
Mt. Ne and Amuba, two very old volcanic peaks. A diverse high altitude
bird fauna and scientifically interesting forests with majestic Nothofagus
stands and areas with Astrapia meyeri would be protected in the proposed
Park.
(7) At Mt. Bosavi a protected area is proposed, occupying and sharing
areas of the Southern [Highlands], Western and Gulf Provinces. The
mountain is an isolated volcano south of the Central Divide. The area
has locally endemic plant species, e.g. the only known site of an
endemic Gnetum species. There are also many bird species. The area
should extend down to lowland forest to preserve areas dominated by
Vatica massak and other lowland species typical for this region.
(8) At Galley Reach in the Central Province, a Reserve for the Mangrove
habitat is proposed. The region is of great scientific interest because
of its diverse mangrove communities. The area is accessible from
Port Moresby and is ideally suited for study purposes, for mangrove
walkways, etc. Many coastal bird species occur in the area.
(9) At Wassi-Kussa in the Western Province, a Park is proposed to
preserve the unique flora and fauna of southern PNG with its close
relationships to the flora of Cape York Peninsula. The most diverse
savannah areas are to be found in this region. They are still poorly
known botanically despite the collection made by Brass.
(10) The Lake Mawiumbu in Western Province should be protected as
an important region in the Fly River basin. The lake contains a great
variety of water plants including four endemic species of Blyxa.
Osborne (pers.comm.) states that this is the most important lake system
of the basin due to its diversity of water plants and the very rich
bird fauna of the region. It is more important than Lake Kutubu (originally
listed as a proposed reserve) even though Lake Kitubu has endemic
fresh water species. Still Lake Kutubu should be declared as a site
of scientific interest as well as a National Sanctuary because of
its extreme beauty. It might be threatened through the discovery
oil.
(11) The Menyamya Aseki - Mt. Amungwiwa area in Morobe Province should
be protected since botanically it is very diverse though yet poorly
known. Mt. Amungwiwa is one of the two known sites for the endemic
genus Piora (Compositae) which is represented by only a single species,
and only known in PNG. Many other plant and animal species of scientific
interest occur in this large area of still undisturbed forest.
(12) In the Owen Stanley Mountains a National Park shared between
several Provinces (Central, Oro and Milne Bay) should be established.
It should include the high altitude areas of the Owen Stanley Ranges,
in particular Mts. Albert Edward, Tafa, Scratchley, Obree, Victory
(local name: Kerorova), Dayman, and Suckling. The area is of exceptional
biological interest with a great variety of plant and animal species.
For example the Salvadori's Teal, Anas walyiyensis, occurs in this
region. Seven giant Water Rats including a yet undescribed species
from the high altitude grasslands of Mt. Albert Edward have been recorded.
At Collingwood Bay the Northern Crown Pigeon, Goura victoria, and
also the Southern species, G.scheepmakarii, has been recorded in groups
up to 15. Mt. Victory has one of the strongest populations of Forest
Wallabies of the whole country. The Musa River area has also Forest
Wallabies and Northern Crown Pigeons; it is furthermore of interest
because of its natural stands of Hoop and Klinkii pine trees. In
conclusion there are strong reasons to propose the Owen Stanley Ranges
for World Heritage Area listing.
(13) On the Islands of Goodenough, Normanby, and Fergusson in Milne
Bay Province all areas over 700 to 1,000m a.s.l. should be protected.
They are of outstanding scientific interest with many plants represented
by local species at lower altitudes than on the mainland which is
due to the Massenergebung effect. There is also a very diverse bird
fauna.
(14) At Manus Province, several smaller and mostly uninhabited islands
should be declared as Reserves. On the main Manus Island an area
from Mt. Dremsel to the south coast should also be protected so as
to preserve the very interesting flora and fauna of this area.
(15) In the Adelbert Ranges in Madang Province an area should be set
aside to protect the flora and fauna of this region, preferably from
the central mountains to the northern coast.
(16) In the Prince Alexander Ranges, East Sepik Province, a Park should
be established to protect the mountain region. The area is of great
scientific interest though yet very little explored.
(17) The Torricelli Mountains in West Sepik Province should be protected
as an extensive Park. It should include the limestone regions and
extend to the north coast where limestone communities are adjacent
to coastal vegetation. The area includes the locally endemic, monotypic
species Rheopteris cheesmannii. This genus is known from only two
collections in this mountain block, both found on limestone, whereas
the Cheesmann collection was picked up from a log in the river (not
on site). Petaurus abidi is a glider apparently found only in this
area. Several water rat species have been recorded including Hydromys
hussoni. The area has recently drawn conservation attention through
the possible discovery of a new Tree Kangaroo species.
(18) The Tower Limestones in Gulf Province should be protected as
an area of extreme scientific interest and diversity. The individual
towers are over 200 to 400m tall and each support an isolated capping
of rainforest. Possibly the Darai Hills south-east of Mt. Bosavi
National Park should be included and the whole area be treated as
part of the Mt. Bosavi National Park.
(19) The Hunstein Mountains in East Sepik Province represent a biologically
very diverse area which requires protection as a Reserve. No collection
has been made here since the the German expedition in 1912, but botanical
diversity is evident. The area is the type locality for Araucaria
hunsteinii. It includes extensive stands of the endemic Kauri species
(Agathis labillardieri) which deserve protection. There is fear that
the area might be logged to extract the Kauri, hence it is an important
area for protection as soon as possible.
(20) The Whiteman Ranges in West New Britain represent an extensive
area of rainforest on limestone and mixed volcanic rocks. It should
be protected because of its scenic beauty and scientific importance.
The flora is still poorly known but very diverse. There is a high
degree of avian endemism with at least 23 species. Endemism is particularly
important in high altitude birds.
(21) The Lake Dakataua in West New Britain is of exceptional scenic
beauty and scientific interest. The area has potential for a major
tourist attraction. Strong efforts should be made urgently to stop
the proposed replacement of the forest by oil palm plantations. Forests
should be managed in a way to maintain their ecosystem and in coexistence
with a potential tourist industry development. The Lake has a saltwater
crocodile population, an abundant bird life, and a myriad of insects,
but interestingly no fish; thus represents a unique type of ecosystem.
(22) The Nakanai Plateau in East New Britain is a region of important
mid-montane forest dominated by two species of Nothofagus. Forest
is very diverse and comprises some local endemic species of Asplenium.
The area deserves protection because of its scientific interest.
(23) In Southern New Ireland a World Heritage Area is proposed because
of its exceptional scenic beauty and extreme scientific interest.
The area should include the rift valley in the limestone and the
mountain ranges to the north and south of it. There is a great potential
for further scientific exploration.
(24) The Lelet Plateau on New Ireland (Central) deserves protection
because of its outstanding botanical diversity. Midmontane forest
is particularly well developed.
(25) The Mt. Takuan in North Solomons Province is an area of great
diversity, especially in respect to its flora. It includes many Pacific
elements and should be preserved. Adequate 'reserves' should also
be established to protect the natural stands of Terminalia brassii
in Bougainville. The mountain avifouna of the North Solomons apparently
shows a high level of endemism.
(26) The Louisiade National Marine and Terrestrial Park in Milne Bay
Province is proposed for World Heritage listing. Apart from a major
marine park which should be established, but which is not further
considered here because the present topic is the forest environment,
a terrestrial park is proposed mainly because of many locally endemic
species in the land based flora. Among them are several endemic species
of Hopea (Dipterocarpaceae) and the Ebony (Diospyros Ebenaceae).
In addition there are species with commercial potential for the establishment
of forest plantations.
(27) The Star Mountains in West Sepik and Western Province deserve protection as an important area for highland species. Many of them are in common with Irian Jaya. The occurrence of Salvadori's Teal has also been reported from this area.
This is the penultimate draft of the 'Report of the Working Group
on World Heritage Areas and Conservation Areas'. Strangely enough,
I have not yet been able to locate a copy of the final draft anywhere
in Port Moresby.
The Working Group has the following recommendations to make for the
consideration and, if thought fit, approval of the full conference
for transmittal to the Government of PNG.
(1) That the meeting strongly supports the PNG Government's policy
objective of developing a National Conservation Strategy which will
set aside and protect a representative system of conservation areas
throughout PNG, with the most outstanding areas to be nominated as
World heritage Areas.
(2) That the PNG Government should accede as a State Party to the
World heritage Convention and submit an indicative list of sites as
soon as possible.
(3) That the proposed areas recommended in the World Bank Report,
Appendix 6, be recognized as areas of high conservation importance,
and this list be refined and added to in the light of further research
and resource inventory.
(4) That the PNG Government implement the existing environment planning
legislation to protect and manage the listed areas, securing them
from commercial forestry, agriculture or other development projects
over which it has control; and that the PNG Government review the
situation of those timber operations lacking an environmental plan,
and develop a strategy for remedial measures.
(5) That there is an immediate need to recognize the conservation
importance and environmental planning needs for the following high
priority areas from the World Bank list: Bismarck Range; Owen Stanley
Range; Southern New Ireland; Prince Alexander Range.
(6) That it be noted that the successful implementation of the PNG
National Conservation System and World Heritage Programme will be
crucially dependent on two factors:
(a) The commitment of the Government of PNG to funding, developing
and protecting the system.
(b) The financial support of the international donor community, which
is particularly needed for funding the benefit packages needed to
secure landowner consent and commitment to conservation areas on their
land.
(7) That the meeting endorse the PNG Department of Environment and
Conservation's proposal for a PNG Conservation Authority and Trust
Fund, and ask for the details of these proposals to be clarified as
soon as possible.
(8) That there is a need for urgency in providing conservation planning advice initially on high priority areas, and to carry out preparatory technical work for the proposed PNG National Conservation System; and that for these purposes, a Task Force supported by a technical adviser should be established and funded to commence work by mid-May. Membership of the Task Force should include representatives of:
The Task Force should urgently provide maps of the listed areas, identify areas of conflict between conservation and development projects, and provide advice to the Minister of Environment and Conservation on appropriate conservation strategies, development regulation, and priority needs. An estimate of the external assistance needs and short term action plan is US$100,000, preferably to be available by June 1990.
This is the text of the Task Force project description which was first
constructed in April 1990, shortly after the Round Table conference,
publicised at a press conference held by the Minister for Environment
and Conservation on the 15/5/90, and then submitted to the TFAP Steering
Committee on 4/9/90. This material was included in a second draft
presented to the Steering Committee on 4/10/90, and a final draft
approved by the Committee on 4/4/91, but with various amendments designed
to meet objections raised by DFP.
Background and Justification
It is widely recognized that the Government has failed to adequately
regulate the timber harvesting activities within the extensive forest
area of PNG. The report on the Forest Enquiry [sic] and the recent
Tropical Forest Action Plan (TFAP) report for PNG by the World Bank
identified the problems in the forest sector and recommended remedial
action. The TFAP report has been endorsed by the National Executive
Council and Government has prepared an action plan to implement the
TFAP.
At the recent conference (2-4 April) the government generated support
from the international donor community to implement the proposed action
programme commencing in 1991. The conference also produced a resolution
calling for immediate action on possible conservation and World Heritage
Areas [Appendix 3]. This resolution identified priority areas for
environmental management and conservation. Of these areas the Lak
TRP, Collingwood Bay and Woodlark Island areas are in immediate threat
of unplanned logging. The resolution, which was supported by relevant
government representation, calls for the establishment of a Taskforce
to provide immediate conservation planning advice to Government and
undertake preparatory work on the TFAP.
The proposed multidisciplinary Taskforce requires immediate financial
and technical support to enable it to undertake the prescribed tasks,
particularly as non-government groups are involved and additional
technical and manpower support will be required for committee and
field work. The conference resolved that the doner community should
support this proposal for urgent implementation by May-June 1990.
The Government must be prepared to offer landowners of proposed conservation
areas a benefit package that may comprise social infrastructure, local
business development and an annual payment. The benefit package should
relate to the agreed land use restrictions and potential revenues
foregone by landowners. Both national and international assistance
will be required to support the benefit package.
A significant task therefore is to research and secure sources of
financial assistance and develop the mechanism to administer the funds.
Taskforce Operations
The Taskforce will comprise representatives from:
- Department of Environment and Conservation (Convener)
- Department of Forests
- Department of Prime Minister and NEC
- Department of Lands and Physical Planning
- Appropriate Provincial Government representatives
- Universities
- NGOs
- Department of Finance and Planning
- Department of Agriculture and Livestock
- Department of Fisheries and Marine Resources
- Department of Minerals and Energy.
The Taskforce will be responsible to:
(1) Prepare maps of listed areas that define areas of high conservation
value and existing or potential land based developments.
(2) Identification of aspects of conflict between development and
conservation objectives.
(3) Provide recommendations to the Government of PNG through the Minister
for Environment and Conservation on appropriate conservation strategies
including regulation of development activities.
(4) Undertake research and investigations into the provision of incentive
packages to landowners in proposed Conservation Areas and possible
funding systems.
(5) Liaise with relevant national government organizations e.g. Tourism
Development Corporation and relevant provincial government organizations.
Basically, the Taskforce will address the environmental planning and
conservation needs in the identified areas. The Taskforce will utilize
additional expertise and assistance from appropriate PNG organizations,
landowner groups, and international experts.
It is imperative that the Taskforce act decisively to effectively
tackle the priority areas. A cooperative effort between national
government, provincial government, landowners and the proposed Permit
Holder will be promoted. Where landowners may forego potential revenues
due to agreed land use restriction, the Taskforce will recommend appropriate
benefit packages for government consideration. Formal landowner acceptance
of the conservation strategy and benefits is essential to the successful
long term conservation of the areas.
The Taskforce will operate for 2-3 years until the Government has strengthened its capacity to wisely manage the forest resource and products of the TFAP are realized. The Taskforce will address selected forest areas considered to have high conservation value and which are or could soon be under a timber harvesting programme. The critical responsibility of the Taskforce will be to present better alternative uses of our forests that not only protect their natural values but generate revenue to the present and future landowners. The ability of the Taskforce to provide attractive benefit packages will largely depend on financial support from the international community of developed nations. Community infrastructure such as roads and bridges and appropriate business developments that generate a sustainable revenue will be the mainstay of the benefit package. The success of this conservation programme is considered vital to the future welfare of the majority of Papua New Guineans who now reside in our forest.
The following summary is based on the listing of projects produced
by DOF for the Round Table Conference in April 1990, which was in
turn largely based on the list of suggested projects included as Annex
10 of the World Bank's TFAP Review.
Department of Forests
What follows is the text of a letter from the PNG Minister for Forests,
Karl Stack, defending himself against the accusation that he and his
department had failed to honour his government's moratorium on the
issue of new timber permits. The letter was published in the Post-Courier
on 2/1/91.
As Minister for Forests, I am very concerned with allegations in an
article and the editorial of the Post-Courier on Thursday 22 November,
1990, accusing the Department of Forests and my Ministry of disregarding
and eroding the moratorium on allocation of forest resources. The
fact of the matter is that my ministry is implementing the moratorium
despite political (both provincial and national) and landowner pressure
to allow more projects to be developed. Despite daily lobbying and
visits by landowners and politicians to the Department of Forests
and my ministry, we are strongly honoring the moratorium, and our
advice to those visitors has been that until it expires in 1992, the
moratorium must stand.
It is true that a Cabinet submission is under preparation to exempt
certain projects from the moratorium. These projects are to be substitutes
for the projects which had been exempted previously under NEC Decision
98/90 and which are now having problems. The concerned provincial
governments and landowners have requested these substitutions, which
in my view are appropriate. The total number of projects exempt from
the moratorium is still five as per the Cabinet decision. I am witholding
the submission pending instructions from the chairman of the NEC.
The Department of Forests is aware of the brief on the moratorium
prepared by the Department of Environment and Conservation. The brief
was responded to by the Department of Forests point by point on 9th
November, 1990, and the overall conclusion is that the brief was full
of inaccuracies. I am annoyed that the brief from the Department
of Environment and Conservation was never circulated to my Department
for checking before it was given to the World Bank officials.
For the information of the public, I am not bound by the Forestry
Act to issue a Timber Permit (Projects under TRP) or assent to a 'Dealings'
(Project under LFA) prior [sic] to the approval of the Environmental
Plan. The submission of the Environmental Plan is a requirement in
the Environmental Planning act, Chapter 370, not the Forestry Act.
Its implementation, therefore, is the responsibility of the Ministry
and Department of Environment and Conservation, not the Department
of Forests or my ministry. If environmental authorities are not satisfied
with certain Environmental Plan submissions, it is their responsibility
to act on those submissions. In the timber permit, it is a condition
for the permit holder to comply at all times with the provision in
the Environmental Planning Act.
There is nothing wrong with the Inland Pomio Project. The project
was advertised and concluded long before the imposition of the moratorium.
To accommodate the wishes of the landowners, the previous timber
permit, which was issued before the moratorium, was surrended and
a new one re-issued to a landowner company acceptable to the majority
of the landowners.
The North Vanapa TRP project is not a new project at all. The Vanapa
North Timber Permit was originally issued by the then Forest Minister,
Lucas Waka, in 1983. A new timber permit was considered and executed
to extend the project life until 2000, which means that the logging
operation is being spread for a longer period.
In the case of the Sogeram TRP project, this resource was advertised
almost three years ago. It is not a new project, being originally
granted to a nationally owned company but after many months of waiting
for the project to get off the ground, it was concluded that the
company does not have sufficient finance to undertake the project.
Due to the wishes of the landowners, who are very keen to have the
project off the ground, the project was renegotiated and allocated
to Madang Timbers (formerly Wewak Timbers), an existing operator in
Madang.
In issuing permits for the above projects, I have not therefore breached
the moratorium.
The Department of Forests and my ministry received a number of communications
from the Lamassa landowners urging us to process their project. So
far nothing is happening as the landowners are not sure whether to
operate the project under TRP or LFA.
The NEC specifically exempted five new projects. They are: Collingwood
Bay, Cromwell, Josephstaal, Arawe and April-Salumei.
The following projects do not need exemption as they were either ready
for allocation or had been allocated for sometime, are extensions
to existing operations or defunct projects being revived:
(1) Buhem-Mongi - Morobe.
(2) East Kikori - Gulf (which has now been substituted from Tauri
TRP).
(3) Lak - New Ireland.
(4) Gara-Modewa - Milne Bay.
(5) Inland Pomio - East New Britain.
(6) North Vanapa - Central.
(7) Sogeram - Madang.
(8) Rai Coast - Madang.
I would like to make it clear it was at my own initiative that the moratorium was imposed and it would be ridiculous if I were now to contradict it by allowing more projects than the ones mentioned above to be exempted.