THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF
RENEWABLE RESOURCE DEPLETION
IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Colin Filer
This paper is due to appear in: Howitt, R.,
et
al (eds), 1996. Resources, Nations and Indigenous Peoples:
Case Studies from Australasia, Melanesia and Southeast Asia .
Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
Introduction
If Papua New Guinea (PNG) can properly be described as a 'nation',
it is a nation which seems to consist entirely of 'indigenous peoples'
- or what Papua New Guineans themselves would rather call 'customary
landowners' - whose collective sovereignty resides in what was once
described as a 'parliament of a thousand tribes', despite the fact
that there are probably ten times that number of traditional political
communities in PNG, while the national parliament can only accommodate
the elected leaders of approximately one hundred 'tribes' at any one
time. If there is one thing which unites this loose confederation
of ethnic groups, beyond the mere fact of statehood, then one would
have to say that it consists either in a general commitment to the
Christian faith or else in an intense desire to achieve the elusive
state of 'development'. But a great deal of the 'development' which
takes place on customary land is unsustainable, since it entails the
continual depletion of renewable, as well as non-renewable, natural
resources. Since PNG's customary landowners retain effective control
over the use of the nation's natural resources, the mismanagement
of these resources may be taken as evidence that indigenous peoples
only become the natural allies of their natural environment when they
have either lost control of it already or have not yet begun to think
that their 'development' requires the sacrifice of their environmental
legacy.
The role of customary landowners in the mismanagement or depletion
of PNG's renewable resources has been placed in the limelight of public
debate by the government's own National Forestry and Conservation
Action Programme, which was initiated in 1990, and by subsequent efforts
to formulate a National Sustainable Development Strategy in pursuit
of its notional commitment to Agenda 21 and a separate Biodiversity
Conservation Strategy which reflects its additional acceptance of
the UN Convention on Biological Diversity. But this outburst of good
intentions has been matched by the forward march of Malaysian logging
giant Rimbunan Hijau, which has now become the dominant force in the
'development' of PNG's forest resource, controlling at least 70% of
the country's log harvest. This company is also a key constituent
in the national government's 'Look North' policy, which is designed
to reduce national dependence on 'traditional' sources of investment
in Australia and other Western countries. All discussions of renewable
resource depletion therefore take place in a social context which
not only features the familiar contrast between long-term public policies
and short-term corporate gains, and thus between 'sustainable' and
'unsustainable' forms of development, but also contains a second opposition,
within the private sector, between a complex of Asian business interests
which now dominate the logging and fishing industries and a group
of 'Anglo-American' companies which still dominate the mining and
petroleum sector. Forest management in PNG has thus become an additional
point of friction between the Australian and Malaysian governments,
a test of national 'governance' in the eyes of the World Bank, and
an opportunity for companies like Chevron to improve their own environmental
image by donating funds to nature conservation projects in their spheres
of operation.
A great deal has been written about the local social impact of mining
and petroleum projects in PNG, firstly because a few large-scale projects
have had such a considerable impact on all aspects of their immediate
environment, and secondly because the operators and the government
have agreed that large amounts of time and money need to be spent
on all manner of environmental impact studies. Much less has been
written about the local social impact of logging or forestry projects,
firstly because this kind of economic activity has been widely dispersed
and locally sporadic, and secondly because the government has failed
to force or persuade the operators to pay serious attention to its
own environmental regulations.1
It may well be feasible to construct a general model of social and
economic change which embraces the impact of all forms of extractive
industry on local landowning communities in PNG, despite the sectoral
imbalance in the nature of the evidence. On the other hand, the way
that 'landowner issues' have actually been addressed in recent debates
about forest management may also lead us to question that peculiar
form of economic determinism which is associated with the professional
practice of social impact assessment. The cries for 'development'
which emanate from all corners of the rainforest are not simply the
effect of what 'developers' have done, or what they now propose to
do, but are reflections of a deepening frustration with the current
pattern of relationships between the rural village and the global
state, a vicious circle of demands and disappointments which constrains,
as much as it reflects, the way that natural resources are depleted
by the engines of extractive industry.
The Castle in the Forest
The independent state of Papua New Guinea was born with a national
constitution which already contained an official commitment to sustainable
development, one of its five goals being 'for Papua New Guinea's natural
resources and environment to be conserved and used for the collective
benefit of us all, and to be replenished for the benefit of future
generations'. At the time of Independence, in 1975, the national
government already boasted a Ministry and an Office (later a Department)
of Environment and Conservation. A detailed statement of Environment
and Conservation Principles was endorsed by the National Parliament
in 1977, and this was followed, in 1978, by three substantial pieces
of environmental legislation - the Environmental Planning Act, Environmental
Contaminants Act, and Conservation Areas Act.
Unfortunately, the state's fine green clothes have not been clearly
visible to the mass of the population and have not always been appreciated
by the smaller number of 'elites' who knew of their existence. Provincial
governments were never given any role in the enforcement of environmental
laws and regulations, but the national department lacked the money
and the manpower to police the exploitation of the country's natural
resources.
Nowhere have these shortcomings been more painfully evident than in
the forestry sector. In the wake of a 1979 white paper which recommended
an increase in log exports as a means of raising government revenues,
a dubious array of foreign logging companies descended on the nation's
shores, and most were allowed to operate without regard to the Environmental
Planning Act. Even in those few cases where environmental plans were
submitted to the Department of Environment and Conservation, the Department
had no capacity to either assess the accuracy of the factual statements,
or monitor the operator's compliance with the promises, which were
included in these submissions, several of which turned out to be the
barely distinguishable products of a single word-processor located
in the government's own Forest Research Institute. For the better
part of the 1980s, DEC had only one officer assigned to the task of
monitoring logging operations in the whole of PNG.
In April 1987 the Prime Minister, Paias Wingti, appointed an Australian
lawyer, Tos Barnett, to conduct a Commission of Inquiry into what
Barnett himself later described as the 'heavy odour of corruption,
fraud and scandal arising from the timber industry'. Two years of
investigations revealed a scene of 'rampage and pillage' in many lowland
areas:
Operations were being commenced illegally; forest working plans, if
submitted at all, were being widely ignored; logging tracks were being
pushed through at the discretion of the bulldozer driver; hillsides
and river banks were being logged; and the immature forest resource
was being bashed and trampled in the reckless haste to get the logs
down to the waiting log ships. The dazed and disillusioned forest
owners stood watching in disbelief as foreign operators removed their
trees before moving on to the next area, leaving environmentally disastrous
logged-over hillsides, temporary gravel/mud roads and rotting log
bridges to erode and cave in to clog the watercourses. (Barnett 1992:97)
And
the source of the smell which prompted the Commission's work was found
in the many documented instances
where in order to gain access to the timber, foreign operators misled
and bribed local leaders, set up 'puppet' native landowner companies,
bribed provincial government premiers or ministers and gave gifts
or bribes to national ministers or members of the national parliament
or took such people into some form of partnership with them. They
also similarly bribed and gave benefits to at least one secretary
of the Department of Forests and other officers. (Ibid:100)
Being
a highlander whose own interests were primarily tied to the coffee
business, Paias Wingti had nothing to lose from Barnett's revelations.
But Wingti had been dislodged from office within a year of Barnett's
appointment, and his replacement, Rabbie Namaliu, was rather less
enthusiastic, primarily because his deputy and coalition partner,
Ted Diro, was the commissioner's most prominent target. Nevertheless,
the national government was moved to acknowledge its own loss of control
over the logging industry by invoking the assistance of the Tropical
Forestry Action Plan, and the World Bank was only too keen to lead
the TFAP review team to PNG because the Bank's own image could be
nicely greened along the way.
In April 1990 a round-table meeting in Port Moresby approved a five-year
National Forestry Action Plan which contained sixteen separate projects
with a combined cost of about forty million kina (the kina then being
roughly equivalent to the US dollar). The greater part of this cost
was to be met by grants and concessional loans from the international
community - most notably the World Bank itself, the UN Development
Programme, and the Australian government's aid budget. These funds
were to be split roughly equally between projects designed to rationalise
the 'development' of the nation's timber resources and projects designed
to achieve the alternative goal of conserving selected areas of special
ecological or cultural significance. For this reason, the Plan was
later renamed the National Forestry and Conservation Action Programme.
During the following year the Forests Minister, Karl Stack, did everything
he could to underline the potential contradiction between these two
general goals. At the round-table meeting he astonished the conservationists,
and might even have irritated the World Bank, by announcing the imposition
of a two-year moratorium on the granting of new timber permits and
an indefinite moratorium on the granting of log export permits; but
once his Cabinet colleagues had approved these measures, the Minister
found so many good reasons to ignore them that he was able to issue
new timber permits at an unprecedented rate. Even after Stack had
been replaced, and a new Forestry Act had been passed by Parliament
in 1991, a rearguard action by vested interests in the bureaucracy
delayed its gazettal until the eve of the national election in June
1992.
Having recovered the premiership in the wake of this election, Paias
Wingti awarded the Forests Ministry to another wealthy white citizen,
Tim Neville, who did rather better than his predecessor at showing
how wealth acquired outside of the rainforest might provide some immunity
from the temptations of this particular office. The flow of new timber
permits finally dried up, log shipments were delayed while the Minister
personally checked their credentials, and rumours of conspiracies
to murder him provided an extra touch of heroism in an Australian
television programme devoted to his exploits. Under the terms of
the new Act, the old Department of Forests was transformed into a
corporate body - the National Forest Authority - and its central offices
were carpeted, refurnished, and secured, at great expense, to keep
the logging lobbyists at bay. By the end of 1993 the newly recruited
Canadian commander of this fortress, Conrad Smith (codename 'Nemesis'),
was ready to bombard the public with press releases and full-page
newspaper advertisements containing the new National Forestry Development
Guidelines:
- all existing timber permit conditions and logging agreements would be subject to
review and possible amendment;
- log harvests would be limited to sustainable levels and raw log exports phased out
completely by the year 2000;
- logging companies were ordered to submit their plans for meeting this contingency
by building factories and plants to process timber; and
- a new revenue system would transfer a larger proportion of their profits to representative
landowner organisations for the funding of infrastructural development
in the vicinity of logging operations.
Each of these volleys,
and most especially the last, drew cries of outrage from the self-appointed
spokesmen of the landowner companies, as well as from the Forest Industries
Association, and thus received a warm round of applause from the motley
band of local NGOs with strong environmental sympathies. But the
clapping soon stopped when Smith went on to declare that each logging
company with a proven commitment to downstream processing would be
granted sole access to an enormous 'timber supply area' in order to
meet its long-term need for raw materials. This proposal touched
the one raw nerve which could be guaranteed to unify the local advocates
and critics of the logging industry, by challenging the hallowed right
of all native Melanesians to decide what should or should not happen
on their customary land.
While Smith and Neville ducked the hail of xenophobic arrows which
resulted from this blunder, Paias Wingti found that he had been deserted
by his deputy and coalition partner, Julius Chan, primarily because
their government had lurched into a massive fiscal crisis. Having
been elected to lead a new governing coalition at the end of August
1994, Chan's first move was to force a substantial devaluation of
the national currency, while the public service was placed in a state
of suspended animation until the money could be found to pay for anything
beyond their salaries. A deathly silence fell upon the castle in
the forest, hardly even broken when it was announced that the new
Forests Minister would be the one member of parliament whose own constituency
accounts for roughly half the logs currently leaving the country.2
Not so long ago, it was possible to argue that revenues from the mining
and petroleum sector would provide a cushion on which the state could
recline while planning and controlling the sustainable development
of its renewable resources. The strength of this argument was certainly
reduced by the forced closure of the Bougainville copper mine in 1989,
but might still have been rescued by revenues from new mining and
petroleum projects developed in the present decade if the state itself
had not lost the capacity to plan and control its own expenditures.
The Mineral Resources Stabilisation Fund collected revenues of less
than K6 million in 1990, but this rose to K13.2 million in 1991, K82.7
million in 1992, K273.7 million in 1993 and K281.1 million in 1994
(see Table 1). The sudden access of new mineral wealth was due mainly
to the profits of the Porgera gold mine and the Kutubu oil field,
but fell to a government whose own mineral development policies were
so thoroughly erratic as to virtually halt the preparation of two
other major projects (the Lihir gold mine and the Gobe oil field)
and cause mineral exploration expenditures to fall to their lowest
level for more than a decade.
It is true that oil prices over the past two years have failed to
meet the government's expectations, and might therefore provide some
excuse for its fiscal crisis, but log export prices over the same
period have reached record levels, and the government was quick to
winch up its own share of the surplus. In 1993, when PNG logs fetched
an average price of US$167 per cubic metre, and a total of 2.8 million
cubic metres left the country, the Internal Revenue Commission collected
about K72 million in log export taxes. In 1994, when the average
price fell slightly to US$158 per cubic metre, and export volumes
also fell somewhat, log export taxes accounted for K141 million (11%)
of the government's total tax revenue (see Table 2). And yet, despite
this extra windfall, added to the revenues from gold and oil, the
government's expenditures have brought it to the verge of bankruptcy.
In 1995 the government cannot afford to spend more than K180 million
from its mineral revenues, but it hopes that log exports will increase
to 3.2 million cubic metres and yield another K163 million in export
taxes. This will entail a total timber harvest of nearly 4 million
cubic metres, which is already beyond the level of 'sustainability'
defined by some of the experts working for the National Forest Authority.
Even if no new timber permits are issued before the end of the millenium,
those issued before the beginning of Tim Neville's reign as Forests
Minister still allow for a harvest of 7.5 million cubic metres in
1995 and almost 6 million cubic metres in the year 2000. It is thought
that logging equipment already operating in PNG has the technical
capacity to harvest more than 6 million cubic metres a year. If the
average cost of extracting and delivering a PNG log to its Japanese
and Korean consumers is still only K50 per cubic metre, if those consumers
are still prepared to pay a final price of more than K150 per cubic
metre, and if local landowners are still prepared to permit the 'development'
of their forests in return for benefits worth less than K15 per cubic
metre, then short-term economic logic surely tells the state to sell
as many logs as possible to pay its mountain of outstanding debts.
Table 1: PNG mineral exports and revenues 1990-98.
|
Mineral export values |
MRSF receipts |
| Year |
K million |
% of exports |
K million |
% of revenues |
| 1990 |
757.5 |
66.3 |
5.6 |
0.7 |
| 1991 |
1005.3 |
71.2 |
13.2 |
1.6 |
| 1992 |
1371.5 |
72.9 |
82.7 |
8.9 |
| 1993 |
1858.7 |
73.2 |
273.7 |
24.3 |
| 1994 |
1840.8 |
67.2 |
281.1 |
21.9 |
| 1995 |
1801.2 |
61.6 |
223.7 |
16.2 |
| 1996 |
1769.0 |
61.2 |
279.3 |
18.8 |
| 1997 |
1674.9 |
58.4 |
245.5 |
16.3 |
| 1998 |
1930.8 |
60.2 |
185.2 |
12.5 |
Sources: PNG Central Bank 1994, PNG Department of Finance &
Planning 1995.
Table 2: PNG forestry exports and revenues 1990-98.
|
Forestry export values |
Log export taxes |
| Year |
K million |
% of exports |
K million |
% of revenues |
| 1990 |
79.6 |
7.0 |
11.4 |
1.5 |
| 1991 |
90.2 |
6.4 |
14.2 |
1.8 |
| 1992 |
148.2 |
7.9 |
24.5 |
2.6 |
| 1993 |
410.4 |
16.2 |
71.6 |
6.4 |
| 1994 |
484.7 |
17.7 |
141.0 |
11.0 |
| 1995 |
604.8 |
20.7 |
163.2 |
11.8 |
| 1996 |
593.6 |
20.6 |
184.8 |
12.4 |
| 1997 |
615.9 |
21.5 |
190.4 |
12.6 |
| 1998 |
641.5 |
20.0 |
196.0 |
13.2 |
Sources: Duncan 1994, PNG Central Bank 1994, PNG Department of Finance
& Planning 1995, PNG Internal Revenue Commission (personal communication).
Note: All forestry export taxes are log export taxes and revenue figures
are for all government revenues minus grants.
But if the state had the ability to follow any kind of economic logic,
we might no longer recognise it as the state of PNG. The fragmentation
of this state increasingly reflects a splintered pattern of development
which even splits the solidarity of tribal groups within its barely
constituted national society. The metaphorical construction of the
castle in the forest reflects the fact that there are no real castles
in this country. The real destruction of the forest will not change
its course as the result of noisy battles fought between the conservationists
and timber merchants in the central corridors of power. It will continue,
certainly, but in an unpredictable, haphazard, messy way, just as
it has done in the past, because the relevant decisions will be taken
by a multitude of 'resource owners' for a wide variety of reasons
which defy the application of a single plan or policy by central government.
The Paradox of Tribal Wisdom
In August 1994, the PNG Post-Courier quoted a 'village leader'
from a remote part of Chimbu Province, which had only recently gained
road access to the outside world, as saying that his people would
'lure a logging company into our area should the government is [sic]
reluctant to do this for us'. The same man promptly qualified his
undertaking (or demand) by adding that 'such a business venture is
liable to destroy the environment, and therefore will be closely monitored
by the government'. Two months later, the same newspaper published
a letter posted from a remote part of West New Britain Province, which
currently accounts for 53% of PNG's total log exports, in which the
writer, 'Log Without End', felt he was obliged to:
expose a feeling that perhaps maybe all those forest owners like me
who have been living among the evergreen forest the rest of our lives
have about logging and critics of logging in our country. Where I
come from, I view logging as stepping stone to development and prosperity
for our population. And I sees (logging) as giving us sunshine.
On the other hand critics of logging particularly non-government organisations
are proven wrong because theirs is a one-sided view. They are giving
us rain..... We, the resources owners by God given right have been
living miserable lives, and have been under-privileged, under-developed
and uncivilized for too long. We cannot watch this opportunity to
improve our lives, stride past. If the government resources is insufficient
to bring forth much-needed changes to our areas, economically and
socially, what shall we do, remain uncivilized for more decades in
the name of environment?..... Finally, I feel that the population
in the logging areas deserve a change in their lives; this is the
foundation of a civilized generation for our tribes, and therefore
we cannot allow such critics [to] deprive our rights to development
and prosperity..... Lastly, critics of logging should not venture
blindly, because this is our birthright and heritage.
The
turns of phrase themselves, which I have carefully preserved, betray
the authenticity of 'grassroot' sentiments like these, which can indeed
be heard in villages throughout the length and breadth of PNG, as
if they were a distant echo of the Malaysian government's pronouncements
at the Rio conference in 1992, albeit mediated, on occasion, by the
blandishments of Rimbunan Hijau and its affiliates.
Yet this should not be taken to imply a simple uniformity of rural
attitudes on matters of 'development and conservation'. Our friend
'Log Without End' was apparently responding to another letter written
by a 'Grade 8 Green Class' situated in another part of West New Britain
Province, which not only reviewed the various forms of environmental
damage caused by logging operations, but also went on to describe
the type of thinking which refuses to acknowledge it:
A very small number of people who claim to be landowners decide what
should be done to and with their land in terms of logging agreement,
etc. They allow aliens to walk right into their land and use whatever
that are there at will while the rest of the people ... are being
tamed with 'flattery' and flat lies. The keyword is royalty .
In Pidgin in simple means: 'Yu Pasim Maus B'long Yu' [You Keep Your
Mouth Shut]. When the minds of the people are flooded with 'royalty'
they become blind and therefore can't realise that we now have more
than enough problems. They become ignorant and stubborn..... The
foreign (particularly Asian) logging companies that are currently
hard at work are nothing more than pests and parasites which have
really infested our surroundings. Now that idea is clear. Pests
and parasites must be destroyed or they will destroy us.
And
while the Chimbu village leader was threatening to lure these creatures
into his own neck of the woods, another 'village elder' was conducting
CUSO-sponsored workshops with Native Canadian bands in British Columbia,
advertising his home community as a group of clans which have 'returned
to their cultural roots, choosing not to be "enclosed" by
Western materialism', and promising 'to explore the power of indigenous
knowledge and the importance of including indigenous knowledge in
the search for alternative models of development'.
The Canadian anthropologist who passed these tidings back to me was
hoping to attend these workshops because they 'sounded far more exotic
than anything I encountered in PNG'. Most anthropologists who have
conducted fieldwork in this country would probably agree that communities
which have collectively and consciously repudiated Western materialism
are a seriously endangered species - if indeed they can be found at
all beyond the populist imagination of progressive intellectuals.
The local NGO which organised the tour of Canada describes itself
as a 'model Melanesian community' whose activities reflect and promote
a version of the 'Melanesian Way' which springs simultaneously from
the goals and principles of the National Constitution, the teachings
of Paulo Freire, the blessings of David Suzuki, and the funds donated
by various international organisations with a vested interest in Third
World literacy and awareness.
It is generally agreed by all interested parties that the aims of
the National Forestry and Conservation Action Programme will not be
achieved unless they command the understanding and support of customary
landowners, firstly in those areas where the extraction of renewable
resources represents an attractive commercial proposition, and secondly
in those areas whose biological diversity provides another source
of value to the international community. It is also generally agreed
that customary landowners will not forgo the economic exploitation
of their natural environment unless they have alternative, and equally
productive, income-earning opportunities. But the large amounts of
time and money which have been committed to this Programme in the
last five years have left a host of more specific questions largely
unresolved. If Melanesians ever lived in harmony with their environment,
how can their ancient knowledge of 'sustainable development' retain
its force when they have cast away so much of their traditional religion
and technology? What factors determine the level at which customary
landowners expect or demand to be paid or compensated for the commercial
extraction of their natural resources by third parties? Are they
really the 'dazed and disillusioned' dupes of foreign 'pests and parasites',
or are they willing partners in a process which makes perfect economic
sense to people who believe that they have tried and failed in all
their other efforts to achieve a reasonable increase in their living
standards? Which communities have the resources and the interest
to take advantage of the markets which sustainable developers can
find for eco-tourism, eco-timber or non-timber forest products? And
is the rural population now dividing into sections which have different
perspectives on the politics and economics of development and conservation
- men and women, old people and young people, the more and the less
educated, or the 'politicians' and the masses?
Why should such questions be so difficult to answer? The first reason
can be found in that same variety of environmental conditions which
has bestowed an estimated five per cent of the world's biodiversity
on less than one per cent of its surface area, for there is a corresponding
variety of traditional cultural formations which has been twisted
into new configurations by the locally divergent impacts of colonial
administration, cash and Christianity. The second reason is that
there has been very little systematic comparative analysis of the
material factors which explain or accompany local variation in what
landowners think and do about questions of conservation and development
- partly because the multiple dimensions of diversity discourage such
an enterprise, but partly also because a scientific approach to questions
of 'landowner awareness' wins no favours with educated Papua New Guineans
who correctly perceive that these are necessarily questions of national
identity as well, and therefore questions which demand a moral tale
in which the heroes and the villains need to be identified in spiritual
terms.
Social scientists and government officials find that their pragmatic,
sceptical assessment of the wants and needs of ordinary villagers
have little impact on those educated members of the national community
whose main priority is to debate the moral virtues of a corporate
bureaucracy, the rights and obligations which accompany their 'elite'
status, or the sinister external forces which corrupt their souls
and tempt them to depart from Paradise. But if the history of Melanesia
shows that its indigenous inhabitants have been such ardent converts
of successive Christian sects, and so persistent in the reinvention
of their own traditions, might this not be reason to believe that
they can only be converted to a new religion of 'sustainable development'
if scientific or pragmatic understandings of their present state do
not destroy their own capacity to make up stories for themselves.
Likewise, the barefoot conservationists who ply the rhetoric of popular
empowerment may be motivated to succeed in their endeavour only if
they share the missionary's faith in beings who are not amenable to
scientific study - in this case the 'true landowners' who really do
possess the wisdom necessary to defeat the foreign devils and their
national accomplices.
To which the sceptic may reply that anyone with much experience of
doing 'landowner awareness' work in PNG will know that villagers are
liable to profess complete ignorance of the subject under discussion,
whatever it may be, until they have figured out what their visitors
or guests would like to hear - and then they tell them that! One
therefore wonders how the representatives of NGOs which are committed
to the principle of 'listening to what the people say' (or what they
really feel or know) contrive to overcome the silence of the village
people who are listening to them. And if our New Age missionaries
manage to elicit ancient forms of local knowledge which have long
been buried by the overbearing power of organised 'development', one
also wonders why they should not be returned into the earth as soon
as experts or officials come again with top-down messages. But what
one often hears, when listening to village people, is the countervailing
economic wisdom which dictates that any form of talk, wherever it
originates, has far less effectivity than fifty kina notes - and
one suspects this point is well entrenched in the 'community relations'
of the logging industry. On this account the paradox of tribal wisdom
is that 'power' persistently evaporates from village conversations
which describe an endless circle through the moral qualities of personal
relationships, while money keeps on talking all the time.
In which case, it may not be the 'virtues' but the 'vices' of the
tribal landlords which can limit the depletion of their natural resources.
While individuals or communities may lapse into the 'handout mentality'
which seeks 'development' in the collection of natural resource rents
from foreign operators, the recent history of the PNG mining industry
suggests that 'local gatekeepers sometimes contribute to the conservation
of their resources by raising the entry fees to the point which deters
all potential customers, either because their expectations of "development"
begin to exceed what can feasibly be realised from some particular
economic activity, or else because they are pricing themselves out
of the market in order to achieve non-market objectives' (Filer 1994:200).
The same egalitarian ethos which persuades the 'grassroots' to decry
the corruption of all businessmen, politicians and foreigners may
have the unintended effect of creating a level of political conflict
over the distribution of 'handouts' which even stops the loggers in
their tracks. Meanwhile, we are obliged to hope that education also
makes a difference.
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Budget Papers .
PNG Post-Courier, 24/8/94, 13/10/94, 26/10/94.
Created by Oliver Kortendick, May 4th, 1996